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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of the measures for
evaluating new tactical command and control (C2) systems
such-as the Combat Vehicle Command and Control System
(CVC 2). Using those measures it discusses the various
techniques available to evaluate CVC2 and recommends the
selection of one technique. In order to establish a strong
foundation for understanding the needs of a battalion task
force C2 system, the systems, processes, procedures, and
standards available to the commanders are detailed. These
assets are related to Orr's Combat Model to aid in the
understanding of C2 at battalion level. The thesis
concludes with the benefits, advantages, disadvantages,
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The U.S. Army currently utilizes tactical command and
control technology that has changed little since WW II for
mounted operations. Battalion commanders and below still
use FM radios, paper maps, and acetate overlays with grease
pencils for graphic illustrations. In an effort to maintain
an edge on the battlefield, the U.S. Army is introducing new
command and control (C2) assets to aid the tactical
commander in his C2 process. The introduction of these new
technologies is designed to keep the U.S. commander's C2
cycle within that of his opponent's. The battlefield of the
future will see the U.S.'s enemies with advanced technology
giving them the ability to strike swiftly and reposition
rapidly. Army commanders must be able to anticipate these
actions, plan their own operations, and disseminate those
plans to subordinate units so that they may be able to shoot
first, fastest, and more accurately than the enemy and
thereby retain their freedom of action.
One attempt to introduce the advancement of new
technology at the tactical level is the Combat Vehicle
Command and Control System (CVC 2 ). CVC2's mission is to
provide the maneuver force commander with accurate, timely
information in order to make decisions, and assist him in
preparing orders and supervising the order's execution. The
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system must be responsive to vehicle mission requirements
and effectively facilitate continuous planning,
coordination, and assessment in every situation. An
additional mission of CVC2 is to aid vehicle commanders in
identifying vehicles on the battlefield as friends or foes.
By communicating and displaying friendly vehicle positions,
CVC2 will reduce the likelihood of incorrectly identifying a
friendly vehicle as an enemy, thereby minimizing friendly-
fire casualties (SSCVCC 1992). The primary goal of C2 as a
commander's tool is the reduction of uncertainty and the
control of battlefield information in an attempt to reduce
chaos. A subsequent goal of improved C2 is the delivery of
increased combat power against the enemy. Consequently,
throughout this thesis, CVC2 is examined as part of the C2
process, not as part of a weapons system.
B. OBJECTIVE
This thesis will examine the development of the
measures of effectiveness, performance, and force
effectiveness and the techniques for evaluation of the
Combat Vehicle Command and Control System using those
measures. The specific tasks which an armor or mechanized
infantry unit execute are scrutinized in the evaluation of
CVC2. Finally, the thesis will analyze the level of
command, phase of battle, and battlefield operating system




This thesis is organized into seven chapters: an
introduction, a description of CVC, a discussion of C2 and
its information requirements, an examination of specific
combat tasks that tactical units must accomplish, an
assessment of the evaluation of CVC2 , an explanation of the
benefits of CVC2 , and a conclusion. Although C2 exists
through the highest levels of command, this thesis will
address only the C2 aspects at the battalion task force
level and below.
Chapter I, the introduction, discusses the background
for automated C2 and the objective and format of this
thesis.
In Chapter II, CVC's capabilities, description,
hardware components, and concepts are described. CVC2's
support of the commander and its relationship to IVIS
(Intervehicle Information System) are also explained. This
chapter outlines CVC2 's mission, operation, description, and
the communication network it creates. The system's
operation section highlights the network's users inside and
outside the battalion, the reports and graphical overlays it
can transmit, and its support of the three phases of battle.
The system description explains the relationship with IVIS,
the major hardware components and their description.i, and
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interface nodes both within and outside the battalion.
Communications, the system's critical link, serves as
the medium to exchange information within the system. To
understand the process, one must comprehend the inputs and
outputs of the system. In Chapter III, the information
required to support the command and control processes and
ý-ystems available at battalion task force, company team, and
platoon are discussed. The process and systems are then
related to George E. Orr's Combat Operations Model to
provide a better understanding of how each piece of the
process and systems fit into the C2 puzzle.
Chapter IV examines several examples of the specific
combat tasks for armor and infantry battalion task forces,
company teams, and platoons and how they should be
evaluated. The U.S. Army currently uses a series of Mission
Training Plans (MTPs) based upon its Army Test and
Evaluation Plans (ARTEP) to develop and evaluate the
training of its units from the individual soldier to the
highest echelons. Selected individual and collective tasks
are outlined for the various specific missions. These MTP
tasks build upon subordinate units as an archway builds upon
its lower stones, being kept in place by the keystone.
Although MTPs are created for units larger than battalion
task force, this discussion is limited to battalion task
force and below. The Army leadership has decided how units
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should execute and train particular missions as out' ned in
the MTPs. These MTPs serve as the baseline for establishing
the new measures to evaluate a new C2 system and determine
how well the system can influence the commander's C2.
Using these MTPs as a baseline, Chapter V addresses the
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance
(MOPs), and measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) in
evaluating the automated command and control system of CVC 2.
Developing measures to assess a new C2 system is more
complicated than developing measures for a weapons system,
since a weapons system's measures can easily be quantified
and a C2 system can not. This chapter also discusses the
techniques that should be used in the evaluation CVC2 with
those selected MOEs, MOPs, and MOFEs.
The scope of tests and analysis designed to assess the
potential contribution of an automated system, such as CVC2 ,
should include the administrative, logistical, intelligence,
and operational aspects of those planning, execution, and
reconstitution activities of at least a battalion task force
and its subordinate elements during sustained operations.
Incorporating an automated command and control system
into the command and control process offers many benefits to
the units that possess and utilize that system. CVC2
provides benefits at the various levels of command, phases
of battle, and battlefield operating systems discussed in
earlier chapters. Although each level and function may
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benefit at each phase of the battle, Chapter VI discusses
those functions and levels which benefit the greatest from
the use of CVC2. The three phases of battle (planning,
execution, reconstitution) will be examined in regards to
the seven battlefield operating systems (combat service
support, command and control, mobility/survivability,
manuever, air defense, intelligence, fire support) and the
levels of command (vehicle/crew, platoon, company,
battalion) within the battalion task force.
Chapter VII concludes the thesis with recommendations
based upon the material presented throughout the paper. A
synopsis of the accomplishments in the system's measurements
is illustrated, in that the success of CVC2 evaluated
against the established measures is presented. The chapter
highlights the advantages and disadvantages gained from an
automated command and control system. It finishes with a
discussion of CVC2 's ability to reduce the commander's C2
decision cycle time.
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II. THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, CVC 2's capabilities, description,
hardware components, and concepts are described as opposed
to the functional aspects, which are discussed in Chapter
VI. CVC2 support of the commander and its relationship to
IVIS (Intervehicle Information System) are also explained.
This chapter covers CVC2's mission, operation, description,
and the communication network it creates. The system's
operation section highlights the network's users inside and
outside the battalion, the reports and graphical overlays it
can transmit, and the support of the three phases of battle.
The system description explains the CVC2's relationship with
IVIS, the major hardware components and their descriptions,
and the Interface nodes both within and outside the
battalion.
B. CVC2 MISSION
CVC2 ,'s mission is to provide the maneuver force
commander with accurate, timely information in order to make
decisions, and assist him in preparing orders and
supervising the order's execution. The system must be
responsive to vehicle mission requirements and effectively
facilitate continuous planning, coordination, and assessment
in every situation. An additional mission of CVC2 is to aid
7
vehicle commanders in identifying vehicles on the
battlefield as friends or foes. By communicating and
displaying friendly vehicle positions, CVC2 will reduce the
likelihood of incorrectly identifying a friendly vehicle as
an enemy, thereby minimizing friendly-fire casualties.
(SSCVCC 1992)
C. CVC2 SYSTEM OPERATION
CVC2 is an automated command and control (C2) system
currently undergoing testing for installation into combat
vehicles from the individual tank and infantry fighting
vehicle through the task force command level. Nodes mounted
within each vehicle enable the system "to talk to" other
vehicles. Vehicles outside the CVC2 system can communicate
with CVC2 equipped vehicles through interface nodes. (Refer
to Figure 2-1.)
Figure 2-1 KEY:
BDE: Brigade CSS: Combat Service Support
BN: Battalion CS: Combat Support
CO: Company ALOC: Administrative Logistics Center
PLT: Platoon TOC: Tactical Operations Center
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Figure 2-1: CVCC System Diagram (SSCVCC 1992)
This system prepares, collects, organizes, displays,
and disseminates pertinent real-time battlefield information
to assist commanders in C2 at the tactical levels of task
force/battalion, team/company, and platoon. CVC2 is an
attempt to get the friendly commander inside the C2 decision
cycle of the opposing enemy commander. This would permit
U.S. forces to act more quickly than the enemy, thus gaining
the advantage in time and space. CVC2 provides the
following C2 decision aids:
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"* near real-time information on enemy activity
"* coordination of mission planning via overlays
"* knowledge of friendly vehicle locations
"* knowledge of threat locations to coordinate
engagement activity
* coordination of team member movement (space and time)
at all echelons up to battalion
* voice override with audible tone during digital data
burst transmission (Diaz, 1992)
CVC2 is designed to function between the individual
combat vehicle and task force commander and tactical
operations center, so that all CVC2 equipped vehicles may
access the CVC database. CVC2's mission is to provide the
maneuver force commander with accurate, timely information
in order to make decisions, and assist him in preparing
orders and supervising the order's execution. At the
various levels of operation (vehicle, platoon, company team,
battalion task force), CVC2 can support the three phases of
battle:
Prior to the battle (Rlanning)
*development of plans
*dissemination of orders
*dissemination of fire support control measures
*dissemination of maneuver graphics
*coordination between adjacent, lower, and higher units
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During the battle (execution)
*calls for fire on enemy locations
*automatic, accurate position location and heading of
friendly vehicles
*intelligence updates on enemy positions
Post battle (consolidation and reorganization)
*units' situation reports on enemy and friendly position and
deployment, and vehicle, ammunition, and personnel status
*reconstitution to rearm and resupply
*new orders for the next mission (Diaz, 1992)
To achieve this support, CVC2 displays and transmits
the following reports and overlays via the Commander's
Information Display (CID). The icons used for friendly and
enemy symbols and graphics adheres to current Army doctrine.
A further description of the CID and its capabilities are
covered in a later section of this chapter.
ALERTS: OPERATIONAL REPORTS: OVERLAYS AND ORDERS:
MOPP status Contact Warning order
Air Spot Operations order
NBC Situation Fragmentary order
Bridge Operations overlay
Minefield laying Enemy overlay
Obstacle Obstacle overlay
Route Fire Support Plan
Fire Plan
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PERSONNEL/LOGISTICS REPORTS: NBC AND SHELL REPORTS:
Personnel status NBC 1
Ammunition status-precombat NBC 3
Ammunition status-combat NBC 4
POL status-precombat NBC 5
POL status-combat Shell, bomb, mortar
Vehicle status Strikewarn
CALLS FOR: MISCELLANEOUS:
Position location Indirect fire
Close air support WILCO
Request for report
(SSCVCC, 1992)
Table 1 and Table 2 show those CVC2 equipped vehicles
that may send and receive the seven categories of messages,
reports, and overlays. The two tables detail who may
control the various messages, who may update graphical icon
posting (e.g. enemy locations, friendly operations), and who
is responsible to monitor, correct, and finalize and approve
text and graphical updates. In accordance with a particular
unit's current procedures, the control of the communications
net is executed by the each unit's established Net Control
Station (NCS). CVC's ability to rapidly reach many
stations with numerous reports and updates is evident
through the tables. Messages shown can be quickly set up
and down the chain of command, decreasing planning and
reaction times. The best use for these messages as part of
CVC2 and its benefits are discussed in later chapters.
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TABLE 1: CVC2 MESSAGE AUTHORIZATIONS (SSCVCC, 1992)
CVC2 DUTY POSITIONS
CVC2 MESSAGE TYPE AUTHORIZED TO GENERATE MESSAGE
MOPP Status CO CDR, PL
Air Alert ALL
REDCON Alert Condition ON CDR, CO cDR, PL
NBC Alert ALL
Warning Order BN CDR, CO CDR, PL
Operations Overlay CO CDR, PL
FRAGO Order ON CDR, CO CDR, PL
Enemy Overlay NONE (TOC(S2) Only]
Enemy Overlay Update BN S3, BN CDR
Obstacle Overlay NONE [TOC(S3) Only]
Obstacle Overlay Update ON CDR, CO CDR
Fire Support Overlay BN CDR, CO CDR
Fire Support Overlay Update RN CDR, CO CDR
Fire Plan RN CDR, S3, CO CDR, PL, PSG, WM
Sector Identification CO CDR, PL
Call for Indirect Fire CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG, WM
Call for CAS BN CDR, CO CDR
Contact Report ALL
Engagement Update BN S3, CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG, WM
Spot report ALL
Situation Report BN CDR, BN S3, CO CDR, PL, PSG, WM
Bridge Report CO CDR, PL
Minefield Laying Report RN S3, CO CDR, PL
Obstacle Report BN CDR, BN S3, CO CDR, PL, PSG, WM





NBC I Report ALL
NBC 3 Report NONE (TOC(S3) Only)
NBC 4 Report BN CDR, BN S3, CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG
NBC 5 Report NONE [TOC(S3) Only)
Shell, Bomb, Mortar Report ALL
Strikewarn NONE [TOC(S3) Only)
Position Update ALL
WILCO ALL
Request (for Reports) BN CDR, BN S3, CO CDR, CO XO, PL
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TABLE 2: CVC2 MESSAGE RECEIVERS (SSCVCC, 1992)
CVC2 SYSTEM NODE AUTO/MAN
MESSAGE TYPE RECEIVERS REVIEWN
MOPP Status All Manual
Air Alert All Auto
REDCON Alert Condition All Manual
NBC Alert All Auto
Warning Order All except BN CDR Manual
Operations Overlay All Manual
FRAGO Order All except BN CDR Manual
Enemy Overlay All Auto
Enemy Overlay Update All Auto
Obstacle Overlay All Auto
Obstacle Overlay Update All Auto
Fire Support Overlay All except PSG and WM Auto
Fire Support Overlay Update All except PSG and WM Auto
Fire Plan BN CDR,CO CDR,CO XO,PL Manual
Sector Identification CO XO, PL, PSG, WM Auto
Call for Indirect Fire CO CDR, CO XO, PL Auto
Call for CAS BN CDR Auto
Contact Report All Auto
Engagement Update All Auto
Spot report All except WM Manual
Situation Report All except WM Manual
Bridge Report CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG Manual
Minefield Laying Report All except PSG and WM Manual
Obstacle Report All Manual
Route Report All except PSG and Wm Manual
Personnel Status/Request CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG Manual
Ammo Status/Request CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG Manual
POL Status/Request CO CDR, CO XO, FL, PSG Manual
Vehicle Status CO CDR, CO XO, PL, PSG Manual
NBC 1 Report All Manual
NBC 3 Report All Auto
NBC 4 Report CO CDR, CO XO, PL Manual
NBC 5 Report All Auto
Shell, Bomb, Mortar Report All Manual
Strikewarn All Manual
Position Update All Auto
Will Comply All Manual
Request (for Reports) All Auto
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D. CVC2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
CVC2 is the primary component of the vehicle upgrade
called Intervehicle Information System (IVIS), which is
designed to increase the overall effectiveness of individual
armored vehicles. IVIS is a series of improvements to
driver, gunner, and commander positions on the MiA2 Abrams
main battle tank and the M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting
vehicle. Some of these many improvements include the
driver's navigation display, gunner's control and
information panel, global positioning sensor, mission
computer, and CVC2 . CVC2 provides the "brains" or C2 for




Figure 2-2: IVIS components (Diaz, 1992)
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The CVC2 system is comprised of replaceable vehicle-
mounted nodes that aid in the performance of command,
control, and








Figure 2-3), a digital Figure 2-3: CID (Diaz, 1992)
communications network
over Single Channel Ground/Air radio (SINCGARS) to augment
the existing analog communications network, a Radio
Interface Unit (RIU) which interfaces between the CID and
SINCGARS (refer to Figure 2-4), and network interfaces for
the non-combat vehicles comprising the logistical
communication nets within the task force and command and
control linkage to the Maneuver Control System (MCS) at
brigade headquarters and other units outside the task force
not equipped with CVC2.
16
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Figure 2-4: CVC2 interface
1. Commander's Information Display (CID)
The CID is composed of Tactical Situation Displays
(TSD) which are displayed on the interactive screen in the
commander's position. The TSD presents the commander with a
current and consistent picture of the battlefield situation.
This picture consists of an electronic map, an own vehicle
position/orientation indicator, and planning/situation
overlays which utilize information contained in the CVC 2
system node's tactical/logistic information database. The
TSD is projected on a computer-generated, color video
display and is updated in real-time. Content and format of
the display is tailored to the CVC2 duty position of the
user. How a commander interacts with CVC2 and how it is
used at each command level is discussed in Chapter VI.
17
Operation of each system's node is tailored to the
echelon of operation of the vehicle commander. CVC2 duty








Each CVC system node allows the user to identify their CVC
2
duty position and to tailor the operation of the node for
the expected mission. This tailoring includes the
following:
*Tactical situation display features and overlays
*CVC 2 message precedence levels and addresses
*Tactical symbol situation set (SSCVCC 1992)
The commander's information display presents received
message status, position/orientation information, and map
controls along the top; a tactical situation map comprising
the electronic map and overlaid symbology in the middle; and
function select buttons along the bottom. A touch overlay
and a handgrip cursor control allow the operator to interact
with the message queues, map controls, and function select
menus. (Refer to Figure 2-5.) CVC2 provides the capability
to archive and retrieve information used to initialize the
system configuration during periods of long-term inactivity
and maintenance.
18
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Figure 2-5: CVC2 Interactive Display (SSCVCC 1992)
TSD generates the electronic map display using a
color representation of Defense Mapping Agency topographic
paper charts as a background image to overlay charts. The
TSD provides user controls for setting the displayed map
scale, map scrolling, and map interpretation functions.
Each CVC2 system node generates the electronic map display
from digital map data stored on removable mass storage
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media. The mass media storage cartridge contains the map
data for the vehicle's area of operation.
The user has the ability to select four map scales:
1:25k, 1:50k, 1:100k, or 1:250k. TSD automatically scrolls
the map to keep the user's moving vehicle at a fixed
location in relation to the screen. A user can manually
override the automatic scroll and move the center of the
electronic map in any direction. An arrow is positioned on
the side of the screen indicating the actual position of the
vehicle in relation to the map orientation. TSD also
provides the map interpretation features of distance and
coordinates and elevation. When the user designates a path
on the electronic map comprised of a series of points, the
TSD calculates and displays the distance along that path.
Additionally, the TSD displays the Military/Mercator Grid
Reference System coordinates and elevation of points
designated on the electronic map.
TSD provides the user the capability to selectively
superimpose tactical planning and situation overlay
graphics, generated from the overlay database, onto the
electronic map.
Symbol design used on the graphical overlays adhere to
current Army symbology as directed in FM 101-5-1. The
symbology color code follows:
Friendly combat unit Blue
Friendly fire support Black
20
Friendly engineer item or obstacle Green
Enemy items Red
NBC contaminants Yellow
TSD can display amplifying information from the
tactical and logistical database on a selected symbol. This
on-call information applies to friendly unit, obstacle, and
enemy unit symbols. On a highlighted symbol, TSD can
display the unit identifier, a color coded graphic
illustrating the unit's status of ammunition, vehicle,
personnel, and POL. Additionally, TSD can provide the
ammunition, vehicle, personnel, and POL reports submitted by






The selection of either the obstacle symbol or the enemy
symbol will display the full text of the CVC2 message which
caused the inclusion of the respective symbol on the
overlay.
The capability to store and transmit accurately
portrayed graphics and full text messages permits the
dissemination of orders over CVC2 . Figure 2-6 shows an
example of a full text warning order matrix distributed over
CVC2 as displayed on the TSD screen. Figure 2-7, also
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distributed over the CVC2 TSD, shows an example of the
necessary graphics that accompanies the warning order. Both
are distributed to subordinate units to ensure correct
preparation for and execution of the plan.
TF1.4 ARMOR PFESV~E MATtRM WARNING ORDER@ 2.96 DTG 04104127Z
ASOGCOA 35XTMC &S ýCOD SCT IMEG "
TI fSSIONd: 17114 ATKS *UMIS JUL92 ALONG AXI Z[NC TO SEOftJ NAIL
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To read the warning order matrix Figure 2-6, first read
horizontally and then vertically. A matrix provides an
abbreviated method to issue orders without having to prepare
and disseminate extensive written orders. Task Force (TF)
1-4 Armor distributed the offensive warning order # 2-98
matrix at 1041 hours on the 4th. Using Company A (column
2) as an example, under task organization, A company is
composed of three armor platoons, one engineer platoon, and
one air defense section. The task force mission is as
stated. A Company is second in the march order from the
assembly area behind the scout platoon (column 6). At 0330
hours on the 6th, A Company will cross the line of departure
(LD) in the battalion lead to initiate the attack. Upon
reaching objective, A Company will seize Objective N-A
within the battalion's Objective Nail. Each of the other
companies and platoons listed on the matrix are read in the
same process. The remainder of the plan not filled out on
the matrix will be disseminated with the operations order.
23
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Figure 2-7: warning order Graphics
(Bryla, 1992)
Figure 2-7 portrays brigade level graphics that would
accompany a brigade commander's order. Task Force 2-54
attacks Objective Torch in the north along Axis Silver.
Aviation Battalion 2/27 attacks along Axis Gold and engages
enemy in Engagement Area Slam. Task Force 1-10 executes the
main attack along Axis Copper, followed by the 3rd Brigade




SINCGARS provides the advantage of the spread
spectrum technique of frequency as a given measure of
security because of the speed at which the radio transmits
its digitized data and voice transmissions spread out over a
number of frequencies. The radio transmitter (RT) changes
frequencies 100 times per second. This starts from an
initial frequency and pseudorandomly hops to another
frequency within the bandwidth of the radio transmitter.
These frequencies are preset and the net must be
synchronized. The synchronization of the net can be done
over the air with a net control station broadcast, or by a
manual set for each radio.(SSED, 1989)
For increased security, the newer series SINCGARS
RT-1523 has an internal encryption module. In the frequency
hopping mode, an analog signal is processed within the RT.
Upon initial transmission, the RT first transmits a series
of synchronization patterns then converts the incoming
analog signal to digital. After the external push to talk
release, the RT adds an end of message (EOM). The receiving
RT strips away the header and converts the digitized voice
back to analog. SINCGARS is capable of storing eight single
channel frequencies for push button automatic setting, and
six frequency hopsets. It supports digital data
communications with rates of 75, 150, 300, 600, 1200, 2400,
4800 and 16,000 bps. Vehicle mounted SINCGARS transmission
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ranges are 35 km for analog voice and 29 km for digital
data. (SSED 1989)
The CVC2 will send its information to the SINCGARS via
a radio integration unit or modem in the form of a digital
or analog signal where it is multiplexed using frequency
shift keying (FSK). The radio integration unit (RIU) is the
key component that controls the input from the Commander's
Information Display and buffers input to be broadcast. The
RIU processes alphanumerics and graphics without impacting
on voice traffic. It does bit error detection and
correction for both transmission and reception of data.
The RIU acts as an internal net control for communications
by buffering data transfer while voice traffic has priority.
Voice traffic can override a digital transmission. (Refer to
Figure 2-8.)




Package k "~*Grapim .I
Figure 2-8: CVC2 system components
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CVC2 interfaces with non-combat vehicles in the
battalion task force to facilitate maneuver force command
and control. The interaction between combat and non-combat
vehicle CVC2 nodes is executed through the use of interface
nodes. As shown in Figure 2-9, the system interfaces with
interface nodes at the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) and
the Administration Logistics Center (ALOC). These
interfaces connect the commanders to battalion intelligence,
operations, personnel, and logistics staffs. They also
provide the interface to the Maneuver Control System (MCS)
and Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) at
higher headquarters and NATO command and control networks.
CVC 2 also provides interface with service support elements
attached to combat units at the battalion and company level.
Figure 2-9: CVC2 Interface Nodes (SSCVCC 1992)
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E. COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
The CVC2 system will operate on the voice combat radio
networks established within a battalion with the primary
networks being battalion, company, and platoon command.
Digital communications will not interfere with analog
transmissions since the system has voice override on digital
messages and CVC2 has a queuing capability. This queuing
prevents messages from being lost and allows the message to
wait for an opening on the radio transmitter. A CVC2 node
will be able to communicate with any other CVC2 node
operating on the same frequency.
In the normal mode of operation the CVC2 node allows
the user to generate digital messages containing overlay
symbols and formatted text to other network CVC2 nodes. The
operator interfaces with a user-friendly menu-driven
control/display panel, the CID. After the user selects the
report he desires to send, the CVC2 system prompts him for
the required data elements to include and those nodes that
will receive the message. A single node may be selected or
all stations on the network can receive the message.
The combat radio net organization of a typical
battalion is shown in Figure 2-10, while the CVC2 battalion
net is shown in Figure 2-11. CVC2 not only provides more
secure radio transmission because of frequency hopping and
digitized message traffic, it reduces the number of radio
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Figure 2-10: Typical Battalion radio network (SSCVCC
1992)
Figure 2-10 shows one battalion command, one operations
and intelligence (0 & I), one administrative/logistics
(A/L), four company command, and twelve platoon command
nets, while Figure 2-11 shows one battalion net, four
company, and twelve platoon nets. CVC2 offers the potential
to consolidate networks and reduce a battalion's need for
three different nets into one net. Command, O&I, and A/L
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Figure 2-11: Battalion CVC 2 network (SSCVCC 1992)
F. SUMMARY
Throughout this chapter, CVC2 's missions, capabilities,
operations, concepts, components, and relationship to IVIS
were described. The C2 support that CVC2 is able to provide
the commander and the communications networks it can create
was also discussed. This chapter examined the C2 system
that will aid the commander, while in the following chapter
the C2 process that supports the commander is described.
CVC2 reduces the stress on a vehicle commander by
automatically performing many of the management functions
previously done manually. Information displays tailored to
the user's needs minimizes the potential for information
overload, permitting the commander to concentrate on
30
fighting the battle. CVC2 does not replace the requirement
for manpower, rather "it reduces the demand on the human
mind and gives it time to do what it does best: creative
decision-making". (SSCVCC 1992) Additionally, it reduces
the commander's command and control participation to one net
versus three. His ability to gather necessary information
has been greatly enhanced.
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III. COMMAND AND CONTROL AND ITS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter demonstrated that the critical
link between the elements of the command and control (C2 or
C2) system and the processes is communications. As
communications serves only as the medium to exchange
information within the C2 system, one must comprehend the
inputs and outputs of that C2 system to understand the C2
process. In this chapter, the information requirements to
support the command and control processes and systems
available at battalion task force, company team, and platoon
are discussed. The assets available at the three levels of
command are identified and described. These inputs and
outputs of the processes and systems are related to George
E. Orr's Combat Operations Model (Orr, 1983) to provide a
better understanding of how each piece fits into the C2
puzzle at battalion level. A clear understanding of the
processes, systems, inputs, and outputs will aid in
understanding the benefits of CVC2 to the commander.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
It seems that whenever one reads a description of C2,
it varies from one publication to another. Everyone appears
to offer their own definition of C2.
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The Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and
control as:
The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely
designated commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission
(Coakley, 1991).
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has reduced
DOD's definition and set forth the following definition of
C2 for all services to follow.
The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,
and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned
forces to accomplish assigned missions (JCS Pub 1-02).
Although JCS Pub 1-02 does not explicitly define the
concepts of command, control, or the C2 process, they are
implicit and serve to establish a basis of C2 for this
thesis. A C2 system consists of those facilities,
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel listed
in the definitions. The JCS definition is intended to
address a myriad of military activities. This section
expounds on the definition as to how it impacts upon and
affects a battalion task force and explains the components
of the five highlighted subsystems of personnel, facilities,
equipment, communications, and procedures, that a commander
has at his disposal.
To further aid in comprehending the potentially
abstract definitions of C2 as defined above, the terms
command and control are elaborated upon. Command involves
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receiving and assessing information about the environment
which includes: enemy forces, friendly forces, intentions,
positions, and capabilities, generating and selecting the
best option, and sending out those orders to execute that
option. Control describes the channels through which a
commander's orders, advisories, admonitions, queries are
passed to his forces.(Coakley, 1991)
Since the system under discussion is currently an Army
program, the following descriptions on the Army's thoughts
of command and control are offered. "Command is the
authority that a commander in the military service lawfully
exercises over subordinates by the virtue of rank or
assignment." Command and control "is the process through
which the activities of military forces are directed,
coordinated, and controlled to accomplish the mission" (FM
101-5, 1984).
C. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
As mentioned earlier, the system is composed of
facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and
personnel. By Army doctrine, these components fall into
three categories: C2 organization (personnel), C2 process
(procedures), and C2 facilities (facilities, equipment,




Although the battalion commander is supported by
his staff, he retains the primary responsibility for command
and control within his unit. At battalion level, four staff
officers in addition to the executive officer aid the
commander. The four officers, S1, S2, S3, and S4, are
briefly discussed.
The S1, battalion adjutant or personnel officer,
has the responsibility for personnel and administrative
functions. These duties include: unit strength accounting,
personnel estimates, replacement assignment, casualty
reporting, and awards and promotions. An additional duty
that he assumes during combat is that of the assistant
officer in charge of the ALOC (FM 101-5, 1984).
The S2, battalion intelligence officer, has the
responsibility to collect and analyze information from
internal and external sources and to transform that data
into timely, pertinent, useful intelligence for the
commander. In doing so, he develops the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield overlays and intelligence
estimate for planning purposes. In coordination with the
S3, he prepares and tasks subordinate units with
reconnaissance and surveillance plans of enemy activity (FM
101-51 1984).
The S3, battalion operations officer, is the
officer responsible for operations, plans, organization, and
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training of the battalion's units. As the operations
officer, his duties require close coordination with the
other three staff officers. He is responsible for
developing the battalion's combat operations orders to
include coordinating all attached assets (fire support,
electronic warfare, aviation, and engineers) with organic
unit operations (FM 101-5, 1984).
The S4, battalion logistics or supply officer, is
responsible for the logistical operations of supply,
transportation, and maintenance. He ensures logistical
support by planning, coordinating, and supervising all
logistical resources, organic and non-organic. In a
deployment, the S4 is the officer in charge of the ALOC (FM
101-5 1984).
Within their functional areas, these staff
officers-are required to continuously collect, collate,
analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information to ensure
efficient and successful operations. The officers must
rapidly process this essential information to provide the
commander with the accurate information necessary to make
informed decisions.
2. Facilities
The command and control facilities employed by the
commander are the means that allow for the processing and
transmission of information and orders necessary to have
effective command and control. The primary facilities that
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exist within the battalion task force are the tactical
operations center (TOC), the tactical command post (TAC),
and the administrative/logistical center (ALOC) (FM 101-5,
1984). The ALOC is currently being renamed as the combat
trains command post (CTCP). Although the names are used
interchangeably, the functions remain identical for both.
The TOC, which is normally composed of the
intelligence, operations, and fire support elements, is the
headquarters responsible for monitoring the current
engagements and for planning the next battle. At the TOC,
located approximately 8-10 kilometers from the forward line
of own troops (FLOT), the battalion executive officer (XO),
the officer in charge of the center, integrates the
logistical and operations aspects of the operation. The TAC
is the battalion commander's mobile command post consisting
of his vehicle and if he desires, the fire support officer's
vehicle. It allows him to be in a position to see the
battlefield at the critical time and place. The TAC's
complement of personnel and its operating procedures vary
within each organization. Battalion commanders may organize
the TAC as they wish. The ALOC, located to the rear of the
battalion operating area approximately 15-25 kilometers from
the FLOT, provides the crucial administrative and logistics
information and support. An additional vehicle not listed
as a primary facility in the task force/battalion is the
operations officer's (S3) vehicle. The S3 maneuvers his own
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vehicle in accordance with the commander's orders so that he
may serve as the commander's directed telescope. As the
commander positions himself in the decisive place, he
positions the S3 in the second most critical location.
(Refer to Figure 3-1.)
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computer support, which is not connected through a local
area network (LAN). A new addition to the command and
control equipment at battalion level is the mobile
subscriber equipment (MSE). MSE provides an alternate means
for the radios to pass information. Similar to a car phone,
the commander can "dial up" a particular member of his staff
and keep the FM frequencies clear. MSE also offers the
capability to send paper copies of reports, orders, and
graphics through a low quality fax machine to higher and
adjacent headquarters and the ALOC. Currently, CVC2 does
not have an interface capability with MSE. MSE is designed
to operate on single assigned frequencies like a cellular
phone, while the SINCGARS radio of CVC2 frequency hops on FM
radio.
4. Communications
Within the battalion, there are three networks
established for the commander to exercise command and
control. They are the command net, intelligence net, and
admin/log net. The command net is the primary command and
control net and is used to exchange operational information,
such as warning orders, fragmentary orders (frago's), spot
reports, and situational reports. This net links the
battalion commander to his subordinate commanders and the
TOC. Other personnel may also speak on the command net as
the situation requires. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)
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Figure 3-2: Primary users of the battalion command net
The second net is the intelligence net, referred
as the operations and intelligence (O&I) net. This net
provides a direct reporting link to the battalion
intelligence officer (S2) from higher headquarters and
organic and attached elements of the battalion. Within the
battalion, the principal users of the O&I net are the
reconnaissance units, the scout platoon (organic) and the
ground surveillance radar sections (GSR, attached). Only
intelligence traffic may be passed over this net, permitting
the information to reach the staff planners with minimal
delay. Reconnaissance units normally provide time critical
information which can have a direct impact on the outcome of




Figure 3-3: Primary users of the battalion O&I net
The third and final net within the battalion is
the admin/log net. This net provides the essential
administrative/logistic communications traffic. A sample of
the traffic includes: casualty, fuel, food, ammunition,




Figure 3-4: Primary users of the battalion admin/log net
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The three battalion communications nets described
earlier are all voice systems, with the exception of the MSE
fax component. The current system provides extremely
limited capability to send text or graphics over the MSE fax
machine. The fax is slow, black and white, and of poor
resolution. CVC2 would greatly improve this part of the
system with high quality, near real-time graphics and text.
CVC2 would also standardize the various battalion report
formats. Currently, each unit establishes their own report
formats and when one unit attaches to another, the attached
subordinate unit must learn the new parent unit's report
formats, often causing great confusion.
5. Procedures
As the reports are standardized within each
particular battalion, so to are the procedures the commander
uses to exercise his command and control. Although
warfighting doctrine is outlined in Army doctrine and
described in manuals, each commander may design his
procedures to accomplish his mission as he desires. Each
commander creates his own unit standard operating procedures
(SOPs) that he wishes his soldiers to operate with.
The sections above described the personnel,
facilities, equipment, communications, and procedures that
are part of the C2 in support of the commander. Each
element may vary slightly between different units as the
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type of unit and personality of the commander dictate the
specifics of each.
D. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
This section will relate George Orr's combat operations
process model (refer to Figure 3-5) to the execution of
command and control in battalion combat operations. The
model attempts to represent combat operations at any level
of military hierarchy. Orr's model is derived from earlier





Figure 3-5: Combat operations process model (Orr, 1983)
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Using a model provides a method for understanding what
frequently appears to be chaos in combat operations. In
regards to military operations, an often quoted German
general from the Second World War once stated, "war is chaos
and Americans practice chaos every day." The model permits
the analysis of the command and control system within the
battalion and offers some insight as to how the commander
can effectively command and control his unit.
Orr's combat model is composed of the five basic
functions: sense, process, decide, act, and intelligence
analysis. These functions are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The sense function involves all the systems and
procedures that gather data from the environment which
include: the scout platoon, attached ground surveillance
radars, field artillery forward observers, company reports,
and higher headquarters intelligence updates. The goal is
to provide continuous coverage of the environment under all
conditions. This data is compiled so that the process
function next occurs.
The process function involves all the processes and
procedures used to deduce the occurrence of specific events
or situations from the data gathered in the sense function
from the environment. It includes guidance and additional
information yielded by the intelligence/analysis function
and is used to match patterns known to indicate specific
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situations or events. Within this block, the results of the
processing are displayed to the decision maker. Raw data
from sensors, intelligence and analysis reports, and
commander's guidance are transformed into spot, situation,
and status reports, and course of action proposals required
by the decide function.
The decide function is the primary function executed
and has the most impact on a unit's operational
effectiveness (Metersky, 1986). This function requires the
commander to take into account the guidance from higher
headquarters, the input from the intelligence/analysis
function, and outcome from the process function. A
commander must demonstrate problem solving skills, commonly
referred to as decision making, and select a final course of
action to issue to his unit.
The act function is the linkage between the commander's
control of the situation and the environment. Act provides
the means to execute desirable changes in the environment. A
battalion commander has several parameters which impact
upon his act function. These basic parameters are the
unit's lethality, vulnerability, maneuverability, and
response time. This function executes the outcome of the
decide function.
In the intelligence/analysis function the two essential
tasks of search and forecasting occur. Search entails the
quest for information concerning the organization,
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structure, capabilities, and intentions of the enemy.
Gathered information ties together the meaning of previously
observed activities and situations. The second task that
occurs is that of forecasting changes to the current
environment. These forecasts guide the sense function by
indicating where and what to look for, guide the process
function by identifying the patterns that signal specified
events and situations, and guide the decide function by
providing assessments and forecasts of the situation and the
evaluation of friendly and enemy possible courses of
action. Completeness, accuracy, and responsiveness are
imperative to the intelligence/analysis function (Orr,
1983).
Orr's combat operations model offers a foundation upon
which to build an understanding of the command and control
functions and their interrelation. Since the model is drawn
as a cyclic event, in some situations not all functions are
completed. A process might be interrupted by new enemy
activity or guidance from higher headquarters. Accuracy and
timeliness of the information flow within the cycle are
essential to successful execution.
E. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROCESS AND THE SYSTEM
The previous sections described the system the
commander has available for command and control and what
command and control functions are involved. This section
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describes how the battalion commander uses each of these
elements of the C2 system in execution of the command and
control process functions.
The battalion organization can be viewed as being
organized into three major components: the commander and
staff, the combat elements, and the combat support elements.
Combat and combat support elements execute the act function.
They provide the interface between the commander and the
environment. The combat companies, scout platoon, and
mortar platoon are the means used to influence changes in
the environment. Their actions are in response to the
commander's orders as part of the decide function. These
actions can be as simple as remaining in position to
executing a night combined arms attack. The combat support
element's actions can range from providing the rations,
fuel, ammunition, equipment, personnel, and repair or
replacement of destroyed combat vehicles in support of the
combat element.
At battalion level, the scout platoon and the ground
surveillance radar sections primarily execute the sense
function. Combat companies execute the sense function when
in close proximity to the enemy. The scout platoon is
considered the "eyes and ears" of the battalion. The
platoon is used to collect information about the environment
to feed into the intelligence/analysis and the process
functions. Normally, information requirements focus on the
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terrain in front of the battalion, the location and
disposition of enemy units, and any enemy actions or
movements.
The battalion commander and staff execute the
intelligence/analysis, process, and decide functions.
Although each are specialists in different areas, the
sections' responsibilities overlap. These sections must
operate in a coordinated and logical manner, sharing
information in order to present the commander with complete
and timely information.
The communications systems described earlier connect
these sections. Figure 3-6 shows the battalion organization
with the related process and how the networks connect them.
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Figure 3-6: Process with network linkage (Slifer, 1992)
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Many elements spread throughout the battlefield compose
the system that a battalion commander has to execute command
and control. Each element is responsible for at least one
of the process functions. An effective communications
network is critical in linking the separated elements
because without good communications the C2 functions can not
be connected. A failure to connect these functions will
degrade the battalion's ability to accomplish successful
combat operations.
F. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL
The critical link between elements of the C2 system and
process is communications. Communications networks are the
primary means by which information and intelligence is
exchanged within the system. In order to evaluate a C2
system, the inputs and outputs to the information
requirements of the commander must be identified. This is
critical for automation of a C2 system because a programmer
can not write a program if he has no knowledge of the inputs
that will be provided to his routine or of the nature of the
desired output (Turban, 1990).
A useful starting point to determine the information a
commander and staff need is to determine the factors
considered when making tactical decisions. FM 100-5, the
Army's Operations manual, identifies these factors as:
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-
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T). The following offers a brief description of the various
METT-T factors.
1. Mission
The mission is received from higher headquarters
and states what each subordinate unit must accomplish. It
clearly establishes the senior commander's intent and
limitations. It is imperative that the mission be
completely understood. The commander and S3 do the primary
analysis of the mission. They decide the stated and implied
tasks that the unit is instructed to accomplish (FMIOO-5,
1986).
2. Enemy
The S2 is required to present all available
information to create an intelligence picture of the enemy.
The exact information concerning the enemy is dependent upon
the unit~s mission. The commander, S3, and S2 examine these
factors with regard to their impact upon friendly forces and
their missions. This contributes to the decisions
concerning future plans and operations the unit will
conduct. Adequate information about the enemy permits the
friendly unit to exploit enemy weakness, reduce friendly
vulnerability, counter enemy strength, or capitalize on
friendly strengths.
3. Terrain and weather
The S2 is also responsible for providing
information on terrain and weather. He uses maps and
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overlays to illustrate his terrain analysis. This analysis
involves an examination of the effect of terrain upon enemy
and friendly forces in the following areas: observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key
terrain, and avenues of approach.
a. Observation and fields of fire
Observation applies as to what can be seen,
while fields of fire determines what can be hit by direct
fire.
b. Cover and concealment
Cover protects personnel and equipment from
indirect and direct fire. Concealment prevents observation
of one force by another. However, concealment may or may
not offer cover at the same time.
o. Obstacles
Natural or man-made obstacles that impede
movement must be considered. The commander requires the
location, extent, and strength of those obstacles to
incorporate into his plan.
d. Key terrain
Key terrain is any area that provides a marked
advantage to the force that seizes and controls it. An
example of key terrain is a hill that permits one unit to
observe or fire upon another.
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e. Avenues of approach
Avenues of approach are the major routes that
an enemy can approach into the battalion's area. These
routes are evaluated for maneuverability, obstacles, and
locations where an enemy or friendly force can be disrupted
or ambushed.
f. Weather
Weather can affect men, equipment, and terrain
because adverse weather can bring operations to a halt. The
S2 provides the commander with information concerning
temperature, precipitation expected, sunrise and sunset
times, and moon phase with the resultant illumination
percentage level.
4. Troops available
A commander must possess information about his own
troops, such as: location and disposition, state of
maintenance and supply, personnel status, morale, and state
of training.
5. Time available
This is critical to every phase of an operation.
All command and control systems must make efficient use of
time. The Army uses the "one-third, two-thirds" rule in an
effort to ensure efficient use of this critical issue. A
higher headquarters should only use one-third of the
available planning time. The two-thirds belongs to the
subordinate unit for their planning purposes.
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METT-T allows the grouping of relevant information
for analysis in order to produce the best plan. This short
description of the elements of METT-T illustrates the
commander's and staff's required amount of information. The
exact type and amount of information depends upon the
mission that the unit has been tasked to accomplish. The
amount of information actually available for use will depend
on the resources available to gather the information, the
amount of information already existing in some kind of
database, and the time a commander and staff can wait for
updated information.
G. METT-T AND ORR'S COMBAT OPERATION MODEL
Orr's model shows higher headquarters providing input
into the decide function (Figure 3-5), often in the form of
a mission. The commander and staff conduct METT-T analysis
of the mission and determine information requirements.
These requirements are then tasked to the companies and
scout platoon to collect the desired information as part of
the act and sense functions. The 52 may be tasked to
provide weather and terrain analysis while the S4 is tasked
to develop a logistics plan to support the operation as part
of the intelligence/analysis and process functions. The
required information comes into the S2 and S3 who evaluates
it as part of the intelligence/analysis function, organize
and insert it into the plan as part of the process function.
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This process is reiterated until the plan must be
disseminated or planning for the courses of action is
complete. The commander then executes his responsibilities,
the decide function, and selects a course of action for the
plan.
H. INFOIRATION INPUTS
Many sources can be asked to provide information to
meet the requirements. Combat and combat support elements
use a number of preestablished standard report formats to
transmit the information within the C2 system. These
standard reports fall into one of two categories, tactical
or logistical. The reports provide different types of METT-
T information depending on the type of report. A spot
report, a tactical report, provides information as to the
location of enemy vehicles. An ammunition report provides
information as to the quantity status of ammunition that a
friendly unit has on hand. The Army is currently trying to
standardize the reports to increase interoperability between
units.
I. INFORMATION OUTPUTS
The output of intelligence analysis, process, and
decide functions are the plans and orders issued to lower
echelons. These missions are issued in one of three
formats: Warning, Operations, or Fragmentary Orders. Each
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are standardized Army wide. They are transmitted to
subordinate units either by voice, courier, or face to face
meetings. Because of the complex nature and detail of the
operations order it is frequently communicated by gathering
the commanders and staff in one location to issue the order.
Our present system does not have the capability to transmit
overlays or text over radios. Both must be hand carried.
This type of system has significant shortcomings in that
commanders are pulled away from their units for long periods
of time and are consolidated with the other leaders of the
battalion in a single location in a hostile environment.
J. SUMIARY
In this chapter, the C2 processes and systems available
to the battalion commander were examined. Understanding the
inputs and outputs of the process will assist in the
comprehension of CVC2 1' s benefit to the commander. Army
doctrine uses METT-T analysis to sort information and to
determine information requirements. Orr's Combat Operations
Model furnished a technique to compare the processes and
systems to the functions.
To gather and store information within the present
system paper forms, journals, and maps with acetate overlays
that are updated by hand, and the memory of staff personnel
are required. (FM101-5, 1984) The entire information
transmission process, the intelligence analysis function,
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and the process function are a11 manual. The standardized
reports for both the input and output of information of the
current system can be made more efficient with automation.
CVC2 applies automation to the process of information
transfer and storage. This system hopes to decrease the
amount of time and effort necessary to present accurate
information to battalion commanders so that the commander's
decision cycle time can be reduced in order to gain an
advantage over the enemy commander.
The command and control process "in essence, is the
process of making, disseminating, and implementing informed
command decisions in order to obtain optimum effectiveness
of the nation's military forces in peace time, crisis,
conflict, or war." (Van Creveld, 1985)
The most important aspect of the process is the
decision output, whose product is the commander's decision,
since the pivotal element of the C2 process is the
commander. The commander's goal is the reduction of
uncertainty about the battlefield environment which aids him
in making optimal decisions.
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IV. SPECIPIC TASKS AND THEIR EVALUATION SCHEMES
A. INTRODUCTION
Examples of the specific tasks for armor and infantry
battalion task forces, company teams, and platoons that must
be examined and how they should be evaluated are discussed
in this chapter. The U.S. Army currently uses a series of
Mission Training Plans (MTPs) based upon its Army Test and
Evaluation Plans (ARTEP) to develop and evaluate the
training of its units from the individual soldier to the
highest echelons. Selected individual and collective tasks
are outlined for the various specific missions. Although
MTPs are created for units larger than battalion task force,
this discussion is limited to battalion task force and
below. Since there are numerous tasks that must be
evaluated and trained at these levels, only a few need be
examined to gain an understanding of the MTPs.
Army leadership has devoted a significant amount of
time and effort in consideration of the wartime performance
measures, MTPs, for its units. These MTPs serve as the
baseline for the development of measures to evaluate new
systems that increase the effectiveness of a unit. With the
testing of the new command and control system, CVC2 ,
measures must be created to determine its effectiveness and
potential for production and introduction into the Army's C2
system. Before creating new measures for CVC2 evaluation,
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one must discern those measures already in use. MTPs that
serve as an evaluation tool for unit training and
performance, also serve as the starting point for CVC2"s
evaluation. This chapter will give the reader an
understanding of those MTPs before developing the actual
measures of CVC's evaluation in a later chapter.
B. MISSION TRAINING PLANS
Mission Training Plans (MTP) provide commanders and
staffs a training and evaluation program for the tank
battalion, infantry battalion, the battalion task force
which is combined tank and infantry companies (ARTEP 71-2
MTP), the infantry company, the tank company, the company
team which is combined tank and infantry platoons (ARTEP 71-
1 MTP), the tank platoon and crew, and the infantry platoon
and squad (ARTEP 7-8 MTP). MTPs are also developed for
other types of platoons which are not discussed here. The
MTP contains guidance for planning and executing training on
critical tasks to wartime standards. As described
previously, these MTPs build upon the subordinate unit's
MTPs. (Refer to Figure 4-1.) It provides the link between
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Figure 4-1: MTP echelon relationship (ARTEP 71-2 MTP,
1988)
The battalion task force has five critical, complex
wartime operations, while the company team and platoon share
tI- same seven critical tasks. Each task is composed of
numerous subtasks that the battalion task force, company
team, and platoon must execute to successfully accomplish






"* Reconnaissance and Security Operations
"* Movement to Contact (71-2 MTP, 1988)
The company team and platoon's seven wartime critical
tasks/missions are:




"* Reconnaissance and security
"* Defend
"* Retrograde (71-1 MTP, 1988)
Refer to Matrix 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 on the following pages for
examples of the mission to task relationships of a battalion









Reorganize 7-1-3022 X X X X X
Consolidate 7-1-3023 X X X X X
Perform Air Assault 7-1-3024 X X
Breakout From Encirclement 7-1-3025 X X X
Perform Screen 7-1-3026 X X X X
Breach Defended Obstacles 7-1-3027 X X X
Maintain Operations Security 7-1-3028 X X X I X X
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and Control the Battalion
Task Force 7-1-3901 X X X X X
Perform S3 Operations 7-1-3902 X X X X X
Command Group Operations 7-1-3903 X X X X X
Operate Main Command Post 7-1-3904 X X X X X
Move a Command Post 7-1-3035 X X X X X
Establish a Command Post 7-1-3036 X X X X X
Maintain Communications 7-1-3401 X X X X X
INTELUGENCE
Perform Intelligence Operatons 7-1-3905 X X X X X
Perform S2 Operations 7-1-3906 X X X X X
FIRE SUPPORT
EmployFireSupport 7-1-3907 I X X X X
Matrix 4-1: Battalion task force mission to task
matrix (ARTEP 71-2 MTP, 1988)
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Perform Logistical X X X X X X I
Planning
Perform Tailgate X X X X X X X
Resupply
Perform Service- X X X K X I K
Station Resupply
Consolidate on the X X X X
Objective
Reorganize on the X X X X
Objective-
Integrate X X X X x x X
Replacements




Provide Maintenance X X X X X X
Support
Process Enemy I I -K X X
Prisoners of War(EPWs)
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Prepare for Combat X X X X "X X
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7-3/4-1034 X X X X X
Maintain
Operation
Security X X X X X X
7-3/4-1057
Defend Against Air Defense
AirAttack
7-3/4-1027 X X X X X X
Perform Aerial Combat Service Support
Resupply
7-3/4-1048 X X X X X X X
Perform Vehicle
Operations
7-3/4-1062 X X X X X X
Sustain
7-3/4-1058 X X X X X X X
Prepare for Command and Control
Combat
7-3/4-1046 X X X X X X X
Consolidate and
Reorganize
7-3/4-1047 X X X X X X X
Matrix 4-3: Platoon mission to task matrix (ARTEP 7-8
MTP, 1988)
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The company team and platoon's seven tasks build
directly upon and support the battalion task force's five
tasks as seen in the mapping below.
Battalion Task Force Company Team Platoon
Move't to contact Move't to contact Move't to
contact
Offensive Operations Attack Attack
Raid Raid
Ambush Ambush
Defensive Operations Defensive Ops Defensive Ops
Retrograde Retrograde Retrograde
Recon and security Recon and security Recon and
security
C. TRAINING AND EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
Tasks are trained through the following techniques.
Evaluation is conducted by the next higher commander from
the unit executing the training.
* Individual soldier's manuals and leader training
- Officer/noncommissioned officer development
(OPD/NCOPD): individual classroom style training for
leaders down to squad and crew level.
- Chalk-talk: the commander or leader walks
through a task or operation step by step with subordinate
leaders and staff.
- Map Exercise (MAPEX): a low cost exercise for
the commander or leader to train his subordinates and staff
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in planning, coordinating, and executing operations and
tasks on map boards and sand tables.
* Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTS): a low
cost exercise conducted in the field on actual terrain with
leaders and staffs but without troops; similar to a MAPEX.
* Battle Simulations: computer assisted exercises for
the battalion staff and leaders include:
- ARTBASS: company level computer simulation
- JANUS: platoon/company level computer simulation
- SIMNET: a platoon level trainer at Fort Knox, KY
* Collective training and evaluation exercises for
battalion through squad and crew level:
- Command Post Exercise (CPX): a medium cost
exercise that may be conducted in garrison or in the field
to exercise the battalion staff and commanders to lead and
control tactical operations by use of tactical
communications.
- Command Field Exercise (CFX): the leadership of
the battalion down to company or platoon level goes to the
field to conduct tactical operations without full troop
strength.
- Field Training Exercise (FTX): the entire
battalion goes to the field for one week or longer duration
and conducts tactical missions. May be composed of several
combined STXs.
65
- Situational Training Exercise (STX): a short
term FTX with limited missions that emphasizes a short
closely related group of tasks.
- Combat Training Center (CTC): the entire
battalion rotates through an Army operated training center
offering the unit as close to realistic combat conditions
short of actual war. (71-2, 1988)
As shown in Figure 4-2, the lower the level of tha
training and evaluation technique, the lower the level of
realism. The method may be simple to execute and replicate,
but the realistic influences of combat are absent. The
ultimate objective is to train as the unit would fight in
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D. COLLECTIVE TASKS
To accomplish a battalion task force operation, the
execution of a sequence of specific collective tasks with
start and end points is involved. Figure 4-3 provides a
block diagram of the possible tasks that may be combined
into a company team attack operation. Figure 4-4 provides a
block diagram of the possible tasks that may be combined
into a platoon attack operation as part of its higher
company team's operation. For example, an attack mission
could consist of the following specific tasks/missions:
"* Occupy an assembly area
"* Perform a tactical roadmarch
"* Perform a passage of lines
"* Move tactically
"* Assault
"* Consolidate and reorganize
A unit may not necessarily have to accomplish all the tasks
outlined in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 on each and every operation.
Although the mission may be attack for both the company team



















Throughout any operation, there are certain collective
tasks that the battalion task force must continually
perform, regardless of the assiqned mission. These common
tasks are referred to as the Battlefield Operating Systems
(BOS). and apply to all task force missions. Strong emphasis
is placed upon the training and evaluation of the tasks
since they are essential to the mission success. The tasks
which apply throughout and are common to all the operations
are:
"* Command and control the battalion task force
"* Perform intelligence operations
"* Employ fire support
"* Perform mobility and survivability operations
"* Perform air defense
"* Perform combat service support operations (71-1,
1988)
E. TRAINING AND EVALUATION STANDARDS
Thus far only the techniques for the training and
evaluation have been discussed. However, because of the
extensive number of standards published in the Training and
Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) in Army manuals ARTEP 71-2 MTP,
ARTEP 71-1 MTP, and ARTEP 7-8 MTP on all the required
subtasks, only a sample i3 presented in this chapter. The
Appendix offers larger and more detailed examples of those
standards that are set forth for unit evaluation. If
additional examples or details on the T&EOs subtasks'
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standards are required, the reader should refer to the three
MTPs above.
T&EO examples 4-1 and 4-2 on the following pages are
only the beginning of the T&EO of those two specific tasks
at battalion task force level. The remainder of those
particular tasks can be seen in the Appendix. The T&EOs for
the company team, platoon, and squad follow the same format
of the battalion task force. During evaluation, an
objective "Go" or "No Go" is awarded to each subtask. Each
subtask has a detailed event that must occur and that
subtask must be completed to receive a go. Every required
subtask standard, from the initiation of a mission to its
termination, is detailed in the T&EOs. A mission of
extended duration can have extensive subtasks to complete
and pass. Evaluated subtasks start with the individual
soldier,-continue through the squad and crew, platoon,
company team, and battalion staff, and end at the battalion
task force commander. These tasks encompass the full range
of operations that a unit must be able to complete as part
of its critical wartime missions.
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AJENT: BJATTALION TASK FORCE
;K: COMMAND and CONTROL the battalion task force (7-1-3901) (FM 71-2, FM 101-5)
ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 (circle)
TRAINING STATUS T P U (circle)
CONDITION: The brigade issues an OPORD, warning order, or FRAGO.
TASK STANDARD:
a. TheTF plan accomplishes the dirceted specified tasks lAW the brigade commander's concept and
intent. The plan is received and understood by the leadership uf the TF. It is coordinated with higher,
adjacent, and supporting elements.
b. The TF is prepared to initiate the mission at the directed time.
c. The TF controls and synchronizes subordinate and supporting elements so that it accomplishes
the mission and preserves the force.
d. The TF keeps higher, adjacent, subordinate, supporting, and supported headquarters inWormed.
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS: GO NO-GC
a. A complete warning order is issued within 15 minutes of receipt of the
brigade order.
b. Warning order is received by all platoons within 45 minutes of issuance of
battalion warning order.
a. Guidance includes restated mission, which includes brigade commander's
intent for the TF, and identifies all specified and implied tasks.
b. Guidance includes instructions on information requirements and initially
required Frcparalion actions (movement, resupply) to start.
c. Guidance is given within 30 minutes of receipt of brigade order.
+is' .ci.. .d....s.to 3Utle..ie.
a. Reconnaissance actions begin to physically gain information on the enemy
and terrain as early as possible.
b. Commander/subordinate leaders and staff conduct personal
reconnaissance when possible. If not, the commander conducts a detailed map
reconnaissance.
c. Subordinate leaders conduct a personal reconnaissance when possible. See
subordinate company and platoon T&EOs.
T&EO Example 4-1 (ARTEP 71-2 MTP, 1988)
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ELEMENT: B1ATTALION TASK FORCE/MAIN COMMAND rOST
TASK: OPEIRATEi main command post (7- 1.3904) (P-M 71.2, Chapter 2; rPC 71.6)
ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 (cirdcl)
TRAINING STATUS T P U (circle)
CONIIITION: 'Ilic TI: pcrforns tactical opicralions and receives an OPORD, warning order, or FRAGO
fromn brigade.
TASK STANI)ARD1:
a. The majin Cl' plans, c,)ordinatcs, superviscs, and communicates to ensure the successful
accomplish~ment of (lie assigned mission.
b. The main Cr submits required operational/ intelligence reports to the brigade IAW brigade SOP.
c. Thc main Cr is not destroyed.
SUIITASKS ANI)S'VANDARI)S: GO NO-GO
41.I-: MaIshCI nioivts and po silfons.
a. Cr survives.
b. Main CP maintains communications with ~all rcquircd stations.
*Issues a complcte warning order to 3ll subordinates- and.siaff within 15
-minutes (if receilpt or a brigade order or instruction.¶ front tive TI'
commander to issue a new OPORD.
*3.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~Yf Witnune rm~nC'QCaaye nhslon.
a. Brigade and division commnanders'intenis arc identified.
b. All specifikd and implied tasks are identified.
c. Comr- ~'ndcr is updated within rive minutes ir hie is not located at main CI' or
aware of brigade ordler.
M4 in C'P OIC collects"''or uptiates estinmates.
a. S3, MSE, imd combat trains C11 providc current and accisrale fricndly status.
Initial stat is is 'provided within 15 minutes. Conuplcted estiimates are available
before commnander's war gaining.
b. S2 provides intelligence estimate, and situational and events templates
before commander begins war ganming.
'S. IF comninAndecr or main CP OIC givesilnitial guidance.
a. Restates mission, which includes% brigade commanders intent [or TI', and
identifies all specified and implied tasks.
T&EO Example 4-2 (ARTEP 71-2 MTP, 1988)
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F. SUIARY
The U.S. Army has devoted significant time and thought
into deciding what each unit must accomplish to guarantee
success on the battlefield. If a unit completes its
evaluation with "Go's", Army leadership feels the unit has
an excellent chance of winning in combat. Any equipment,
personnel, or procedures added to the battalion task force
must also pass the T&EOs (Training & Evaluation Outlines)
for combat success. A reorganization of the task force must
enhance its ability to perform particular missions more
effectively. New navigational equipment might permit the
battalion task force to operate better under limited
visibility conditions. New communications equipment might
allow the unit to pass messages more quickly and securely.
Regardless of the equipment on hand and operational, the
personnel assigned and structured, and the procedures of
operation, a battalion task force must pass the T&EOs.
The standards as outlined in ARTEP 71-2 MTP, ARTEP 71-1
MTP, and ARTEP 7-8 MTP are the basis for evaluating a unit's
performance and readiness level. These are the minimum that
must be achieved to pass. Should new technology appear that
increases the performance of a unit, the unit must still be
able to complete the established T&EOs, as a minimum. A
unit's performance should increase if properly trained on
the equipment. Once trained on the new system, the time
required to perform the task should be reduced and the
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successful completion rate increased, driving the need for
redesigned standards. As necessary, those T&EOs outdated by
the advent of new technology can then be updated to new
standards. Established T&EOs are the first step reached
before new equipment manufacturers can proclaim that the
equipment enhances the unit's ability to fight. The systems
must be able to meet the currently established standards
before introduction into the unit. T&EOs define the minimum
standards that provide the baseline for the evaluation of
all new equipment destined for the battalion task force and
its subordinate units.
In this chapter, examples of the T&EO tasks that an
armor or infantry battalion task forc-2 must complete, the
level the tasks are evaluated at, and the cechniques used to
execute those evaluations are described. MTPs provide the
basis for the evaluation of individual soldier and all
echelons through battalion commander. Subordinate unit MTPs
support the MTPs of their next higher command level. These
MTPs and their assigned T&EOs establish the groundwork for
the standards of any new equipment, personnel, or procedures
introduced into the battalion task force.
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V. CVC2 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The outcome of combat in the future will depend heavily
upon technological advances in weapons systems and weapons
supporting systems.(Fu, 1989) Measures for weapons are
easier to identify than for weapons supporting systems. C2
systems act as supporting systems for the weapons system and
evaluations are usually subjective in nature. However, C2
systems' evaluations are elusive and prove difficult to
quantify, thereby making the measures open to dispute since
the results are often qualitative. The scope of tests and
analysis designed to assess the potential contribution of an
automated system, such as CVC, should include the
administrative, logistical, intelligence, and operational
aspects of those planning, execution, and reconstitution
activities of at least a battalion task force and its
subordinate elements during sustained operations.
As stated previously, the primary goal of C2 is to
reduce the uncertainty on the battlefield for the commander.
A subsequent goal of improved C2 is the delivery of
increased combat power against the enemy. The first step in
evaluating CVC2 is to recognize that CVC2 is an information
system which provides the means to support command and
control. It is not an end in itself.
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This chapter will address the considerations that must
be accounted for in the evaluation of a command and control
system. It will examine what the development of the measures
of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs), and
measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) in testing the
automated command and control system of CVC2. It will also
discuss the various techniques that may be utilized in the
evaluation of CVC using those selected MOEs, MOPs, and
MOFEs. The issues of planned use, cost, replicability, and
realism are focused upon as they impact upon the evaluation.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL EVALUATION CONSIDERATIONS
In designing and evaluating a C2 system, six basic
characteristics are required to enhance the system's ability
to aid the commander. These are:
1. Reliability- The "ability of an item to perform a
required function under stated conditions for a specified
period of time" mean time between failure (MTBF). (JCS Pub
1, 1987)
2. Survivability- The ability to withstand attacks
through hardening, mobility, redundancy, dispersal, and
distributed networking. (Martin, 1984)
3. Flexibility- The ability to adapt cuic.:ly to
changing environments and a wide range of operations and to
evolutionary changes to keep pace with state of the art
technology. (Bethman, 1989)
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4. Responsiveness- The ability to quickly and
accurately respond in a timely manner.
5. Interoperability- The ability of "systems ... to
provide services to and accept services from other systems
... and to use them to operate effectively together". (JCS
Pub 1, 1987)
6. User-orientation- A system designed for the user.
It must have "useable information presented or displayed in
clear, unambiguous format; and should not require elaborate
interpretation". (Martin, 1984)
A major advantage of an automated C2 system is the
ability to rapidly execute coordination. This ability to
rapidly execute coordination is complementary to the
previous six characteristics and can be incorporated into
the characteristics of interoperability and the first part
of flexibility. Coordination can be organized into and
analyzed through four methods of integration: ideology
(doctrine), standardization, mutual adjustment (horizontal
integration), and direct command and control (vertical
integration). The two methods which have the most to gain
from an automated C2 system are the mutual adjustment and
direct command and control. Mutual adjustment occurs as
commanders on the same level horizontally solve their own
problems and execute coordination. This reduces the need
for vertical information flow and commander's intervention
and direction. Direct command and control is
79
"hierarchically arranged" (Jones, 1992) with the overall
commander at the peak of the hierarchy. It is exemplified
by the principal of unity of command. This method
emphasizes vertical information flow and reduces
flexibility.
In designing an automated command and control system,
one must consider the many issues that effect the system's
planned use and expected performance. The six
characteristics previously listed form the first six blocks
in constructing the C2 system. These issues establish the
framework in the development of the measures for CVC2
evaluation. For CV&, coordination is a primary concern as
part of the system's ultimate goal of improving performance.
C. MEASURES DEVELOPMENT
In the development of measures, one should always
search for historical examples or existing measures before
"reinventing the wheel". The Army has gone through great
effort in developing its standards for unit operations and
evaluations as described in the previous chapter. These
MTPs (Mission Training Plans) serve as the baseline in
measures development for new systems. Command and control
is one battlefield operating system with existing standards
which may serve as the starting point for measures
development for a new automated C2 system. (Refer to Matrix
4-1,4-2, and 4-3, and Example 4-1 in Chapter IV, and the
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Appendix). Improved C2 systems strive for the principle
objective of improving the commander's decision cycle time
by reducing the uncertainty and controlling information
about the battlefield. This objective drive all measures
development.
One must understand the requirements of the C2 system
as defined by the commander prior to selection of measures.
The author recommends a simple five step process to assist
in this. The first step is to ask the commander what he
wants and needs in the system. After understanding the
requirements of the system, the second step is to evaluate
the unit's operations and procedures exercised through their
standard operating procedures (SOPs). The third step is the
development of a proposal for the new C2 system that is
presented to the commander in the fourth step. Finally, in
the fifth step, after making any adjustments suggested by
the commander, develop the new C2 system.
Before one can discuss measures development, one must
agree on the definition of each measure. A set of measures
should be mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, and
small in number. The following offers a definition for each
measure to be addressed.
MOP: the degree to which a particular system
accomplishes its mission and other assigned tasks. It
describes what a system can do; normally described in
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numerical terms, i.e., a cannon can fire 20 rounds per
minute under standard conditions.
MOE: a quantitative indicator of the ability of a
human, human/machine or machine system to accomplish the
task-within an operational environment for which it was
designed, a "good surrogate for the real goals" (Rockower
1985). For a military force, it is a measure of the force's
ability to accomplish its combat mission, i.e., the cannon
described above can hit the target 19 of the 20 firings. It
must reflect the objective, be targeted at the appropriate
level, and be kept simple. Some examples of typical MOEs
include:
*number of enemy casualties
*number of friendly casualties
*time to accomplish mission
*rate of advance or withdrawal
*scenario dependent
MOFE: the measure of how well a system and its parent
force perform their missions (Metersky, Sovereign, and Sweet
1985). The measure gauges the system's contribution to the
total effectiveness of overall battle outcome, i.e., the
cannon successfully defeated the enemy attack.
Since CVC2 is an automated C2 system, only measures for
the evaluation of command and control are developed.
Target acquisition and engagement are not addressed. With
modern direct fire gun systems, it is assumed that the if
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the target can be seen and identified and assigned to a
weapons system for engagement, it can be hit and killed.
D. MEASURES
*The criteria, hypotheses, and measures listed below are
based upon the extractions from several documents on command
and control system's evaluation. These documents include:
Combat Vehicle Command and Control Battalion-Level
Preliminary Evaluation (1992), M1A2 Adjunct Analysis (IVIS
Volume) (1992), CVC2 Criterion Measures CateQories (1992),
Test and Evaluation Plan for the MIA2 Abrams Tank Early User
Test and Experimentation (1991), Test and Evaluation Plan
for Maneuver Control System (MCS) Early User Test and
Experimentation (EUTE) (versions 1992 and 1993).
These documents provided the foundation for the
criteria, hypotheses, and measures selected for CVC2's
evaluation. Those indexed relate back to the overall
objective of CVC2 , which is to reduce the commander's
decision cycle time by reducing the uncertainty and
controlling the chaos of the battlefield. The measures
created had to pertain to a battalion task force in the
execution of a combat operation that included all three
phases of battle: planning, execution, and consolidation
and reorganization. Refer to the diagram in Figure 5-1 for
the relationship between the objective, criteria,
hypotheses, and measures.
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Figure 5-1 shows the path from the overall objective of
improving the commander's decision cycle time to each
measure used to evaluate CVC2's ability to achieve that
objective. Each numbered criteria, hypothesis, and measure
is described on the following pages beginning on page 81.
The path originates with the objective and flows to the two
criteria (numbers 1 & 2), which is further broken down into
hypotheses. Rejection or non-rejection of these seven
hypotheses (numbered 1A through 7) serve to support or
denounce the objective. To evaluate the hypotheses,
measures are developed for each hypothesis. These measures
are numbered 1A-1 through 7-8. In this method, each measure
can be traced back through the path to the hypothesis and
criteria its supports, and to the objective.
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Objective Reduce dedsion cyde time
HYPOTHESES
II
1A- 1B- IC 2A- 2B- 2C 3- 4- 1 "a 7-




1A-1 1B-1 10.1 2A-1 28J-1 2C-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 8.01 0 71-1
1A-7 1B-5 10.4 2A-6 2B.4 20-7 3-3 44 5-4 6-10 7-8
Figure 5-1: Relationship of objective, hypotheses, and
measures
In the following discussion of measures the reference
to "reports" is made numerous times. This is done to
simplify the measures descriptions. Whenever "reports" is
listed, it is to equate to all operational, administrative,
logistical, intelligence, NBC, and shell reports, overlays,
orders, and calls for fire. Basically, any message traffic
whether text or graphics is lumped into "reports".
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The scenario used to evaluate the following measures
involves one maneuver brigade operating with atleast two
battalion task forces. Each battalion task force is
equipped with identical equipment and personnel levels.
However, one of the battalion task forces shall be equipped
with CVC throughout its units. Headquarters, field
artillery, combat engineers, air defense, and air assets
composing the normal battalion and brigade combat, combat
support, and combat service support elements will be
operational to support the battalion task forces.
MOE #1: Amount of time CVC2 reduces the commander's
decision cycle time by improving his situational awareness,
and thereby increasing the rate of mission success.
MOPE #I:- Amount of time CVC2 decreases the unit's planning
and execution time, increasing the rate of mission success.
CRITERIA #1: CVC enhances a unit's timeliness by providing
accurate situational awareness information to all CVC2
equipped units at all echelons during planning, execution,
and reconstitution phases of the decision making process.
HYPOTHESIS #IA: CVC 2 enhances the timeliness of situational
awareness information by decreasing the time it
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takes for the information to pass from the observer to the
commander.
MOP #A-i-: Number of user attempts required to perform
basic CV& tasks successfully.
MOP #1A-2: Time to perform basic CVC2 tasks successfully.
MOP #1k-3: Time from one CVC2 CID (Commander's Information
Display) data base update comprising each report to a
corresponding update at other CIDs.
MOP IA-4: Time from unit location change until the CIDs
within and between echelons report the new location.
MOP IAk--: Time from unit status change until the CIDs
within and between echelons report the new status.
MOP IA-6: Time from transmission to actual reception by the
leader who needs the information of critical data for the
decision-making process.
MOP 1A-7: Time from transmission to actual reception by the
person who needs the information.
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HYPOTHERIS IB: CVC2 enhances the accuracy of situational
awareness information.
MOP IB-1: Accuracy of data from one CVC2 CID data base
update comprising each report to a corresponding update at
other CIDs.
MOP IB-2: Percent of agreement between data base unit
status and command post mapboard unit status within the same
command post.
MOP IB-3: Percent of agreement between data base unit
location and command post mapboard unit locations within the
same command post.
MOP IB-4: Percent of data that is critical to decision-
making process which is correctly flagged and processed and
delivered to the person who needs the information.
MOP 1B-5: Percent of data that is perishable which is
correctly flagged, prioritized, processed and delivered to
the leader who needs the information.
HYPOTHESIS 1C: CVC2 enhances the information flow of
situational awareness information.
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HYPOTHESIS #2C: CVC2 enhances the information flow for
synchronization of combat operations.
MOP 2C-1: Number of formatted reports existing in data base
which are transmitted.
MOP 2C-2: Number of unformatted reports or voice messages
which are transmitted.
MOP 2C-3: Percent of reports retrieved from database.
MOP 2C-4: Percent of leaders and staff expressing belief
that CVC 2 enhances the commander's ability to synchronize
combat operations.
MOP 2C-5: Percent of message traffic transmitted through
CVC2 .
MOP 2C-6: Percent of C2 analysis functions which could be
performed using CVC 2 that are actually accomplished by other
means during planning, execution, and reconstitution phases.
MOP 2C-7: Percent of leaders and staff users expressing
belief that CVC2 improves the capability of subordinate
leaders to take initiative in synchronizing battle actions
during planning, execution, and reconstitution phases.
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HYPOTHESIS #3: CVC2 training prepares leaders and staff
users to integrate CVC2 C2 tools and functions into the
performance of their C2 duties.
MOP 3-1: Percent of total message traffic transmitted
through CVC2.
MOP 3-2: Percent of C2 analysis functions which are
supported by CVC2 during the planning, execution, and
reconstitution phases.
MOP 3-3: Percent of times the lack of use of CVC2 is
attributed to a training deficiency.
HYPOTHESIS #4: CVC2 does not increase the operational
burden on leaders and staff.
MOP 4-1: Number of hours for CVC2 users per day for on-duty
time working, on-duty time not working, and CVC2 usage time.
MOP 4-2: Number of soldiers assigned to CVC operations.
(compared to non-CVC operations).
MOP 4-3: Ratings and comments of users about adequacy of
manpower.
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HYPOTHESIS #5: Wearing of NBC and environmental protective
clothing does not degrade operations of CVC2 .
MOP 5-1: Time to select, format, and send a CVC2 report.
(with and without protective clothing).
MOP 5-2: Time to retrieve and reply to a CVC2 report. (with
and without protective clothing).
MOP 5-3: Operator time to perform basic CVC2 tasks
successfully. (with and without protective clothing).
MOP 5-4: Percent of scheduled tasks completed during a
predetermined shift period. (with and without protective
clothing).
HYPOTHESIS #6: CVC2 human engineering design supports
effective performance of C2 tasks.
MOP 6-1: Number of attempts to perform basic tasks.
MOP 6-2: Operator time to perform basic tasks.
MOP 6-3: Time from one CID update of data base comprising
each report to a corresponding update at other CIDs between
and within echelons.
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HYPOTHESIS #7: CVC2 enhances overall mission performance
through the planning, execution, and reconstitution phases.
MOP 7-1: Number of missions successfully completed.
MOP 7-2: Time to complete each mission.
MOP 7-3: Percent of enemy vehicles killed by friendly
forces.
MOP 7-4: Number of fratricide hits and kills.
MOP 7-5: Dispersion distance of individual vehicles while
maneuvering.
MOP 7-6: Average velocity of individual vehicles while
maneuvering.
MOP 7-7: Average amount of fuel consumed by individual
vehicles.
MOP 7-8: Number of times a vehicle is out of assigned
sector.
The previous several pages outlined the measures to be
used in the evaluation of CVC2 . Those measures when tested
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in the scenario and environment described provide the
measures and techniques necessary to properly examine the
ability of CVC2 to reduce the commander's decision cycle
time by reducing uncertainty and controling information
about the battlefield.
The introduction of a new automated command and control
system can be detrimental to the unit's C2 performance.
Leaders can be distracted from their primary responsibility
of leading the soldiers and directing the battle by becoming
overly focused on the system updates. Enhancements of
timeliness, accuracy, and information flow can be hindered
instead of improved if the system is not utilized as
designed. These issues, or distractors, are discussed in
Chapter VII.
E. EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
In the history of modern warfare, the procurement,
test, and evaluation of C31 systems has always been a
difficult process. New systems being developed, as well as
older systems undergoing modernization, are becoming
increasingly complex and expensive. In order to meet an
increasingly technologically complex threat, the projected
environments in which these systems must perform are driving
the complexity of our automated systems. As a result, the
performance of these systems in a wartime operational
environment has become difficult, if not impossible, to
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emulate. Neither traditional development nor operational
testing alone can fully address C31 system performance
issues because of the inability to characterize the
projected environment. In addition to the inherent level of
system complexity and the increasing synergy among these
systems, the testing of C31 systems is subject to
significant peacetime constraints, including cost,
environmental restrictions, operational security, and human
factors. These factors will dictate an increased
sensitivity to operational suitability issues in the future
dealing with modernization. (Illgen, 1990)
In order to properly analysis a C2 system, one must
have the capability to gather data on the selected MOEs and
MOPs. The following describes a variety of methods to
collect that data.
1. Modeling: "A model is a simplified representation
of the entity it imitates or simulates." (Hughes, 1984)
2. Experimentation: The process of conducting tests or
trials to verify or invalidate a hypothesis.
3. Simulations and War Games: These can be either
manual or computer assisted and can be executed repetitively
in short periods of time. The data is only as good as the
inputs into the simulation or war game." (Bethman, 1989)
4. Exercise Data: Information collected from military
field exercises can be very useful. However, field problems
do not truly reflect combat, can not be replicated, and are
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Command and control systems such as CVC2 lend
themselves to testing with reduced field exercises and
soldier involvement because they do not require the firing
of weapons for evaluation. SIMNET at Fort Knox Close Combat
Test Bed presents a fine example of how simulation can be
used for C2 system evaluation. However, SIMNET does not
permit the evaluation of the full potential of CVC 2. All
three phases of combat; planning, execution, and
reconstitution, must be examined at the levels of platoon
through battalion. SIMNET permits the evaluation of only
the execution phase at only one company level.
Because of the significant contribution an automated
tactical C2 system makes to the Army, higher evaluation
costs should be accepted. Training, along with limited
evaluations, for the use of CVC2 can occur with computer
simulations. Synthetic environments, such as SIMNET tied
into virtual reality simulators will provide a more
realistic, slightly higher cost evaluations. However,
although "operational testing is limited by time, funds, and
ranges or training areas available, actual system testing
with typical operators will always be required." (Hardy,
1992)
The Army's C2 system is comprised of a combined
arms team consisting of elements from all branches. To
achieve the desired combat effectiveness a high degree of
coordination and synchronization is needed. A good final
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test and evaluation scenario would involve a standard
maneuver brigade with two or three battalion task forces.
Two of the three battalions would be like units, one
equipped with CVC2 , one without. All else, equipment and
personnel levels, would be identical. The brigade should
have normal combat support and combat service support to
include artillery, engineers, air, and air defense assets.
An environment similar to those executed at the National
Training Center (NTC) is the most preferable.
The National Training Center currently offers the most
realistic environment, short of actual combat, for
evaluating a new C2 system. Although NTC is a training
center and not a testing center, its time may have come to
assist in testing evaluation. As the Army reduces in size
the number of operational units and active installations,
fewer locations exist for testing evaluation. Additionally,
fewer units will be available to rotate through the NTC.
This will open up time in the center's schedule for testing
evaluation. It will also enhance its reason for existence
in the light of the decreased Warsaw Pact massive assault it
was designed to train units to fight against. This would
eliminate any non-use time at the center and compensate for
the loss of other manuever and testing areas.
The center is configured with sensors throughout the
manuever area to record massive amounts of data from
individual soldiers and vehicles through brigade level
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operations. With the instrumentation already in place, time
and money would be saved by not having to install the sensor
equipment at another location. Working in conjunction with
the instrumentation, are the Observer-Controllers who
require no additional training to work with the CVC2
equipped battalion. Their techniques would remain the same
for all units. A well trained Opposing Forces (OPFOR) unit
already exists at NTC for friendly CVC2 equipped units to
combat. The rotation's duration of two weeks is
sufficiently long enough to fully exercise the system.
During the evaluation, around the clock operations are
conducted, allowing no let up during the two weeks. In
addition to the force on force exercises at NTC, units
conduct live fire exercises.
NTC provides the opportunity to evaluate all the MOPs,
MOEs, and MOFEs in a realistic combat environment. It can be
controlled, does not require additional time and money to
create the test evaluation range or manuever area, and is
the next best thing to actual combat.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter examined the considerations that must be
addressed in the development of C2 evaluation criteria. It
discussed the development of those measures and presented
the MOEs, MOPs, and MOFEs that should be considered when
examining CVC2 . Finally, the chapter analyzed the various
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evaluation techniques for a new C2 system. One must keep in
mind that CVC is a command and control system, not a
weapons system. The increase in the total number of enemy
vehicles or soldiers killed versus the total number of
friendly vehicles or soldiers killed is only one measure for
consideration. Improved C2 systems strive for the primary
objective of reducing the commander's uncertainty about the
battlefield. This objective drives all measures
development. Once the measures are developed, the actual
evaluation can occur. Several methods exist for CVC 2
evaluation, from analysis to combat training centers.
Simulations offer different techniques fjr evaluation, but
can not replace the ultimate need for operational testing
with real soldiers under realistic conditions.
To ensure that tactical uncertainty exists during the
system's evaluation, chaos must be permitted to enter "the
play". Freeplay must be allowed to demonstrate if units get
lost or cause fratricide. The new system is supposed to
reduce the occurrences of both. The unit and maneuver scale
must be large enough. For CVC2 , this means at least one
battalion with the appropriate maneuver area. The scenarios
of several battles must be long enough without pauses for
data collection to introduce fatigue and time constraints.
During the evaluation, the only thing that should be
controlled is the scenario through the assigned mission
tasks. A new command and control system can not be properly
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or adequately tested in a laboratory or workshop. CVC2 must
have the man-in-the-loop with all the uncertainty and chaos
of today's battlefield.
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VI. BENEFITS OF CVC2
A. INTRODUCTION
Incorporating an automated command and control system
into the command and control process offers many benefits to
the units that possess and utilize that system. CVC 2
provides benefits at the various levels of command, phases
of battle, and battlefield operating systems discussed in
earlier chapters. Although each level and function may
benefit at each phase of the battle, this chapter will
discuss those functions and levels which benefit the
greatest from the use of CVC 2. The three phases of battle
(planning, execution, reconstitution) will be examined in
regards to the seven battlefield operating systems (combat
service support, command and control,
mobility/survivability, manuever, air defense, intelligence,
fire support) and the levels of command (vehicle/crew,
platoon, company, battalion) within the battalion task
force. Figure 6-1 graphically represents the relationship
between the phases of battle, levels of command, and the
battlefield operating systems. CVC2 enhances the unit's
ability in each individual "cube" so that eventually the
battalion task force's ability to conduct the larger entire
"cube" is improved. The "cube" will be used throughout this
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Figure 6-1: Contributions of CVC2
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B. PLANNING
The use of CVC2 in the planning phase reveals the
greatest benefit for the unit, regardless of its level. A
unit that develops a better plan and issues that plan to its
soldiers, with the soldiers understanding that plan, will
require less command and control during the actual execution
of the battle. Subordinate leaders and soldiers that have a
clear understanding of the commander's intent, concept of
operations, and the responsibilities of subordinate units do
not require constant supervision during the execution phase.
A unit that requires less clarification of orders and
direction from superiors will be able to execute their tasks
more swiftly and gain the advantage of time. CVC2 aids in
this planning process by providing clarity of the plan with
text and graphics based upon the most recent friendly and
enemy status' and locations and timeliness of the plan's
issuance. It allows planners to "optimize the use of time
by routine use of warning orders, situation updates, and
anticipatory planning and positioning of forces"(FMlOO-5,
1986).
In the planning phase, company and battalion levels gain
the most from an automated command and control system.
Individual vehicle crews and platoons do much of their
planning face to face with their soldiers because it is the
lowest level of command and the proximity of soldiers and
vehicles to one another. A company and battalion is much
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more dispersed than the platoon and can not always get the
necessary leaders together to formulate a plan. These
leaders might also be in the process of executing the
current mission. Figures 6-2a through 6-2d offer a
comparison between the different levels of command and
battlefield operating systems as to the benefits of each in
the planning phase. Although each level of command gain in
each battlefield operating system, only those with the most
significant benefit are highlighted. "Overall the greatest
contribution of CVC2 appears to be in the "Planning"
function of the C process"(Miller,1992).
Combat service support is carried out primarily at the
company and battalion level while the platoons and vehicle
crews report their status. At this phase, command and
control is conducted in person at the lower two levels while
command and control is conducted over radio or wire at the
higher two levels. As part of mobility/survivability, each
level needs to report the locations of enemy and natural
obstacles and the initiation and completion of friendly
obstacles. Manuever covers a unit's plans of attack routes
or fighting positions as each level of command must plan for
their offensive and defensive movement. Air defense is
planned principally at the battalion level. A unit at each
level can not properly plan its next mission without
accurate intelligence on enemy and friendly units, such as
size, activity, location, equipment, and mission. Fire
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support planning for indirect fires is conducted by the
platoon leadership and higher commands, while the battalion
staff also plans for close air support. Vehicle crews
execute their platoon and company indirect fire support
plans.
The cube diagrams represent a three dimensional
relationship between the levels of command, phases of
battle, and battlefield operating systems. For example in
Figure 6-2a, at the vehicle level of command during the
planning phase, the battlefield operating systems of
intelligence, maneuver, and mobility/survivability gain the
largest benefits. In Figure 6-2b, at the platoon level of
command during the planning phase, the battlefield operating
systems of fire support, intelligence, maneuver, and





































Figure 6-2d: Battalion Planning
C. EXECUTION
If a mission is properly planned, disseminated, and
understood, this phase becomes slightly easier. A unit is
more flexible and better able to react to enemy actions and
more-swiftly execute their own to retain the initiative.
Army doctrine specifies that "tactical offenses are rapid,
violent operations that seek enemy soft spots, rapidly shift
the main effort, and exploit successes promptly" (FMl00-5,
1986). CVC2 permits a unit to execute its mission in just
such an environment. Refer to Figures 6-3a through 6-3d for
a comparison of the levels of command and operating systems
in the execution phase.
During the execution of a mission, the combat service
support is essentially executed at battalion level, while
company level and below are fighting the battle. A platoon
controlling four vehicles or a battalion controlling fifty
require swift and constant command over their unit.
Successful and complete command and control is imperative to
mission accomplishment. CVC2 will permit the necessary
control with rapidly transmitted graphics and message text.
In mission execution, all levels of command need accurate
information on any obstacle so that the obstacle may be
avoided and not delay or prohibit mission accomplishment.
Manuever is the largest element of the execution phase
and of extreme importance to each level of command. CVC 2
permits timely reporting and control of each unit's manuever
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to their superior commands. Accurate position reporting
allows each commander a better "picture of the battlefield".
As in the planning phase, air defense remains the primary
responsibility at battalion level.
Timely, accurate, clear, and useful intelligence on
enemy and friendly locations and actions is essential to all
levels of command. During a mission, the unit requires only
intelligence that may impact upon their mission. "Dumping"
too much intelligence on a unit is as bad as not giving any
at all. Units must be able to process the intelligence
passed from all levels of command. This intelligence flow
can be controlled by the leaders at each level as they
validate and collate the information into a useful
intelligence package.
Being able to digitally request fire support over CVC 2
will greatly speed up the process for indirect fires.
Leaders at each level will be able to see the fire missions
requested by other units. This will prevent redundancy in
indirect fire support missions, permit consolidation at
higher levels for the support, and provide an additional





























Figure 6-3d: Battalion Execution
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D. RECONSTITUTION
"Reconstitution is focused action to restore
ineffective units to a specified level of combat
operations"(FMlOO-5, 1986). This may include personnel,
supply, or equipment replacement and reestablishment of the
chain of command. In this phase the greatest gain for all
levels is combat service support as evidenced in Figures 6-
4a through 6-4d.
In the past, combat service support was done almost
entirely by voice message and paper copies. With CVC2,
units can prepare their personnel, ammunition, and vehicle
status reports and transmit the report with the push of a
single button. The whole process is quicker since leaders
at each level do not have to transmit each combat service
support report individually over the radio. A process which
currently takes an inordinate amount of time. Units will no
longer have to guess the locations of damaged, destroyed, or
missing vehicles as they can be located based upon their ast
automatically updated position by CVC2 during the battle.
At all levels of command, intelligence on the locations of
friendly combat service support elements, friendly combat
units, and the enemy situation impact upon the effectiveness
of reconstitution. Command and control during this phase is
conducted face to face at crew and platoon levels, while
command and control at company and battalion is conducted
over radio or wire. As with the planning and execution
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Figure 6-4c: Company Reconstitution
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Figure 6-4d: Battalion Reconstitution
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E. SUMMARY
CVC& offers significant benefits to each level of
command in the seven battlefield operating systems during
each phase of battle. In this chapter however, only the
most significant contributions in each area were
highlighted. The CVC2 contribution cube allows a graphical
representation of each particular area's contribution. The
levels, systems, and phases are closely interrelated and
must be examined together to properly evaluate the benefits
from an automated command and control system. The benefits
from CVC2 are great and will enhance any unit's ability to




This thesis examined the development of the measures
and techniques required to evaluate a new tactical command
and control system for the battalion and below. CVC2
provides an opportunity to evaluate a new C2 system where
measures have not previously been selected. As C2 measures
are difficult to quantify in concrete values and numerical
figures, measures must be carefully chosen. The first step
is to ascertain what the tactical commander requires for C2
improvement. After resolving those requirements, measures
can be created with the foundation being the measures
already in existence in the Mission Training Plans (MTPs).
In order to establish an understanding of CVC2 and the
inputs and outputs of an automated C2 system, a description
of the hardware components is furnished in Chapter II and
factors involved in the C2 process are described in Chapter
III. Chapter IV discussed the MTPs that serve as the
baseline for CVC2 evaluation. The measures listed in
Chapter V detail those measures that should be used in CVC2
evaluation. All levels of command gain from an automated C2
system as highlighted in Chapter VI.
No one evaluation technique is adequate for the testing
of CVC2 from beginning to end. Computer simulations such as
SIMNET offer a satisfactory method for proof of concept.
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However, to properly test a new C2 system, humans must be
added into the loop at all levels. Each leadership and duty
position which stands to gain from an automated C2 system
must be represented. A computer simulated environment does
not sufficiently evaluate the commander's ability to control
the chaos and uncertainty of the battlefield. Human
interaction with "freeplay" that introduces the chaos and
uncertainty must be permitted to "play itself out" in the
evaluation. Only a field exercise with troops can create
the true environment necessary to test CVC2 's ability to
influence C2. CVC2's testing and evaluation requires
humans-in-the-loop at all levels, the ability for "freeplay"
to influence chaos and uncertainty, an evaluation of
extended duration, and appropriate measures to be considered
as successful and complete.
B. ADVANTAGES
As with all new technologies, advantages and
disadvantages arise with their introduction into a unit.
One major advantage of CVC2 is that it may allow the
friendly commander to get within his opponent's C2 decision
cycle. Ability to plan and react quicker enables the
friendly commander to gain the "upper hand". The amount of
time to plan and execute missions and to react to changes in
those missions is greatly reduced through the acceleration
of the commander's decision cycle time and increasing the
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tempo of his operations. Other advantages of CVC2 are the
increase in message transmission speed, the clarity of that
transmission, the accuracy of graphics and text included in
the transmission, the flexibility it gives the unit
commander, and the increase in situational awareness.
CVC2 significantly increases the speed of message
traffic and graphics dissemination to subordinate, adjacent,
and higher units. The increase in transmission speed of
intelligence summaries, operations orders, or logistical
reports permits the friendly units more time to plan for or
react to enemy activity. Communications traffic is also
reduced because of the speed of digital burst message
transmission. CVC2 allows for a better plan and an
automated process which therefore requires less command and
control during the execution. This in turn leads to less
time on the net, reducing the electronic signature.
Another advantage is the clarity of the transmitted
messages. With CVC2 , one individual can transmit the
message to all appropriate units and sections without having
to rely on an operator to send the message over the radio
and attempt to get acknowledgement from the receiving
stations. Each receiving station would receive the same
message.
The third advantage is the accuracy of the message.
Prior to transmitting, the sender can verify the message,
whether text or graphics, on his display for correctness.
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If any correction is required, it can be quickly made. With
the push of the send button, all designated units receive an
accurate text or graphical display message. Situational
awareness is now improved, thereby lifting some of the "fog
of battle".
Flexibility is a fourth advantage. A commander can
quickly send and receive reports and situational updates
without having to wait for an opening on the voice radio
net. He now has the ability to transmit information and
intelligence to all subordinate units simultaneously or
selectively. With this ability to rapidly reposition
forces, he can swiftly alter previous orders to react to new
battlefield situations. CVC2 enhances the commander's
ability to mass forces at the critical time and place.
CVC2 increases the user's situational awareness of
friendly and enemy locations. This in turn could lead to
the reduction of potential fratricide.
C. DISADVANTAGES
One disadvantage to automated C2 from CVCC is the loss
of face-to-face contact between a commander and his
subordinate leaders. Talking directly to a junior leader
permits the emphasis on certain aspects of an order, such as
commander's intent. Face-to-face discussion alerts the
commander to any problems that his subordinate may be having
which is not disccrnible over the radio. Eliminating the
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face-to-face opportunity, CVC2 therefore reduces the
commander's ability to exert real leadership.
Another disadvantage is the installation of CVC2 into
modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles adds to an
already technologically complicated system. The system will
require operators to undergo additional training on its use
and maintenance. Soldiers that service the equipment will
also require special training since it is a computerized
system. However, the components are fault-tolerant, easily
expandable, and provide integrated diagnostics. Each
component is standardized in all vehicles to ease the
logistical burden.
A third disadvantage is the diversion of the leader
from other tasks as he becomes preoccupied with the new C2
system. As the leader is engrossed in CVC 2 updates and
orders validation, his entire C2 process slows down instead
of speeding up. CVC2 is an aid to the commander, not the
solution to his C2 problems.
The fourth and fifth disadvantages revolve around the
verification of taskings and updates. Potential confusion,
the fourth disadvantage, can arise as to the origin of the
unit's taskings. An order can be forwarded over the system
without some method of control. Unsigned orders raise
questions about their validity and origination. As the
fifth disadvantage, time is then spent verifying the
accuracy of the information updates and database in the
124
system and the validity of unsigned transmitted orders,
slowing the C2 process down.
A final disadvantage is the increased traffic on the
one radio net. Consolidating the three battalion nets onto
one offers the potential for message backlog and delays.
Even with digital data transmission, during the battle
everyone will be trying to transmit at the same time.
Leaders must understand when to send each message based upon
its priority and appropriateness to the tactical situation.
D. ISSUES
With the automation of command and control, several new
issues that did not previously exist with manual systems
arise. The first is the preoccupation of the leader or staff
officer with the automation instead of the battle. A leader
can become too concerned with the data entries and not the
current situation. CVC2 is a tool to aid the leader in the
execution of his duties and not the target of his entire
focus.
CVC2 must be developed with the ability to directly
interact with other automated systems currently in use or
planned for future procurement. The system designed for the
battalion and below must be able to interface with brigade
and higher command and control systems or
administrative/logistical systems at the battalion level. A
higher echelon command and control tool, Manuever Control
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System (MCS) is being fielded for use at brigade through
corps level. Without a direct automated interface between
CVC and MCS at either battalion or brigade level, the
transaction will have to be done manually, negating any
benefit of automation at both levels.
Interaction with other elements of the combined arms
team within the Army and with other services outside of the
Army must also be devised. A team is only as good as its
slowest player and if elements of the combined arms team can
not interface with CVC2 , then the entire team suffers from a
slow C2 process. In the future, Army units can expect to
execute joint operations with elements of other services. A
CVC2 equipped unit requires the ability to use its automated
C2 system in the coordination of missions with the other
service.
As more leaders gain the ability to update CVC2's
database, information overload, information redundancy, and
information inaccuracies will occur. A prime example of
this is the intelligence update or spot report. The same
report, viewed from several locations, can be entered by
several leaders, thereby rapidly filling up the database.
Each leader sends a report on enemy activity whichs results
in three reports on the same event. These reports may or
may not reflect the same location for the enemy activity.
Leaders at the various levels can monitor and aggregate the
input to reduce the overload, redundancy, and inaccuracies,
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but can easily become overcome themselves. An automated
warning system needs to be created that provides a warning
to the user entering the data that a report previously
exists or conflicts with a different, existing entry.
A method must be designed to validate or "sign" the
order to subordinate units. Without the subordinate leader's
voice recognition of the senior officer and authentication
procedures which are possible over current radios,
acknowledgement as to the originator of an order is not
possible over CVC2 . Questions then arise as to validity and
time must be taken to determine the order's origin, thereby
slowing the C2 process down and negating the benefit of an
automated C2 system.
E. POTENTIAL
In the evaluation scenario tested at the National
Training Center, the CVC2 equipped battalion task force will
outperform the non-CVC2 equipped battalions. Both
battalions are properly trained on small unit tactics and
are proficient on individual fighting skills. Although the
individual battalions' scout platoons might identify the
enemy at the same moment, the task force with the automated
C2 system will react quicker to the threat. Messages do not
have to be relayed from one net to another as with voice
systems. All stations receive the same message and graphics
about the enemy. Having a status about friendly unit
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locations and dispositions within the database, the
commander can then issue orders without having to update all
elements on the enemy situation. With a unit properly
trained on CVC2 , and its standard operating procedures,
issues such as information overload, diversion from the
battle to update CVC2 , and message delays are avoided. In
each of the established measures, CVC2 equipped units will
outperform the non-equipped units.
With CVC2, all levels of command (crew, platoon,
company, battalion) in all battlefield operating systems
(fire support, intelligence, air defense, maneuver,
mobility/survivability, command & control, combat service
support) throughout all phases of battle the equipped units
can be expected to perform quicker and with more accuracy
than the non-equipped units.
Possible slowdowns for the equipped unit will occur
when the soldiers are not familiar with or adequately
trained on the new system. The CVC2 unit will be engaging
the enemy and reacting to its movements while the other
battalions are still clarifying the situation and planning
their own actions. As a result, the CVC2 battalion task
force will act quicker, retain its freedom of movement,
destroy more of the enemy, suffer fewer casualties, and win
the battle.
Advantages and disadvantages exist with each new
system's introduction and use. Capitalizing on the
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advantages and negating the disadvantages can be
accomplished through the establishment of procedures and the
training of leaders/users. Solving the issues that exist
with CVC 2 will only increase its performance and ability to
aid the commander. CVC2 has demonstrated significant
potential to reduce the commander's C2 decision cycle time.
It will reduce the time required to plan and transmit
reports which reduces the time required for the unit to act.
This will permit the unit to gain an advantage in time and
space over the enemy. Combat Vehicle Command and Control is
an automated command and control system long overdue with
great benefits to be gained by those U.S. forces using it.
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APPENDIX: BATTALION TASK FORCE TRAINING &
EVALUATION OUTLINES (T&EOs)
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ELEMENT: BATTALION TASK FORCE
TASK: COMMAND and CONTROL the battalion task force (7-1-3901) (FM 71-2, FM 101-5)
ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 (circle)
TRAINING STATUS T P U (circle)
CONDITION: Thc brigadc issucs an OPORD, warning ordcr, or FRAGO.
TASK STANDARD:
a. The TF plan accomplishes the directed specified tasks lAW the brigade commander's concept and
intent. The plan is received and understood by the leadcrship of the TF. It is coordinated with higher,
adjacent, and supporting elements.
b. The TF is prepared to initiate the mission at the directed time.
c. The TF controls and synchronizes subordinate and supporting elements so that it accomplishes
the mission and preserves the force.
d. The TF keeps higher, adjacent, subordinate, supporting, and supported headquarters informed.
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS: GO NO-GO
+••l•il-aders ithe t airnin..order.
a. A complete warning order is issued within 15 minutes of receipt of the
brigade order.
b. Warning order is received by all platoons within 45 minutes of issuance of
battalion warning order.
.2•. IF commander analyzes mission and gives initial guidance.
a. Guidance includes restated mission, which includes brigade commander's
intent for the TF, and identifies all specified and implied tasks.
b. Guidance includes instructions on information requirements and initially
required preparation actions (movement, resupply) to start.
c. Guidance is given within 30 minutes of receipt of brigade order.
+ .T!accomplshes-reconnaissance and others ac6ios to gthernede
a. Reconnaissance actions begin to physically gain information, on the enemy
and terrain as early as possible.
b. Commander/subordinate leaders and staff conduct personal
reconnaissance when possible. If not, the commander conducts a detailed map
reconnaissance.
c. Subordinate leaders conduct a personal reconnaissance when possible. See




SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS: GO NO-GO
b. Disseminate and coordinate critical new information with higher, adjacent,
and supporting headquarters.
4.0.: TF executes changes in tosk organization.
a. Main CP coordinates linkup location, time, and responsible element.
b. Attachments/new elements are received at the coordinated location and
time; updated on current situation, OPORDs, and SOls; and resupplied.
c. Detachments reach the linkup point at the time and place directed.
+ 0.II ~tpite an cmm er 'and stf 6--uct sUpel and mnitor
a. Commander conducts briefbacks with subordinate commanders, leader.,
and key staff.
b. Main CP maintains status of preparations.
c. Elements make effective use of time to prepare for the operation.
4-11. Tseesth battlefield.
a. Command group is positioned to see and move.
b. Comranies and other subordinates accurately report critical information on
actior.s and changes in combat status within five minutes. See subordinate
MTPs.
c. Maia CP collects, analyzes, and passes processed critical information.
d. Subordinates execute intelligence collection plan.
+ *12. TF Ieaderstcopoomand and control the ftecution.
a. Subordinate elements report enemy and friendly actions, change in status,
and any other factor that would require change within three minutes.
b. TF leaders win the battle by directing the maneuver of units, controlling
direct and indirect fires, and directing other CS actions to cope with new
METI-T factors. Indicators are:
"* Elements not following OPORD are corrected.
"" Responses to new METT-T are directed when new situation
occurs.
"* No friendly casualties inflicted by friendly direct or indirect
fires.
"* Number/percentage of direct fire weapons engaging enemy.
"* Number of indirect fire rounds fired and percentage
hitting/suppressing the enemy.
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9 Number of friendly casualties.
c. Command and control, and CSS assets are controlled to support maneuver
effort. Indicators are:
"* Effective CSS, and command and control.
"* Command and control or CSS element not destroyed by enemy direct
fires.
d. FRAGOs are clear, concise, and quickly executed by subordinates.
e. Changes that affect the battle are disseminated within five minutes.
"* All battle actions requiring coordination between battalion elements
are laterally coordinated.
"* All battle actions requiring coordination with other headquarters are
laterally and promptly coordinated.
.. .. .Veot .. . 'z~
*TFCPs submit all critical and required reports to brigade. They report
events to adjacent and supporting elements that impact on them in time
for those units to react.









ELEMENT: BATIALION TASK FORCE/MAIN COMMAND POST
TASK: OPERATE main command post (7-1-3904) (FM 71-2, Chapter 2; FC 71-6)
ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 (circle)
TRAINING STATUS T P U (circle)
CONDITION: The TF performs tactical opcrations and recciveqs an OPORD, warning order, or FRAGO
from brigade.
TASK STANDARD:
a. The main CP plans, coordinates, supervises, and communicates to -ensure the successful
accomplishment of the assigned mission.
b. The main CP submits required operational/intelligence reports to the brigade IAW brigade SOP.
c. The main CP is not destroyed.
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS: GO NO-GO
+ I. MainC m ie nd'posi ions.
a. CP survives.
b. Main CP maintains communications with all required stations.
•a A nP Issues, arnin .e iers
* Issues a complete warning order to all subordinates and staff within 15
minutes of receipt of a brigade order or instructions from the TF
commander to issue a new OPORD.
~4. T cmmndr or S1111 CF** OIC alyemion.
a. Brigade and division commanders' intents are identified.
b. All specified and implied tasks are identified.
c. Commander is updated within live minutes if he is not located at main CP or
aware of brigade order.
*4ie•al', CP OJC collects ri ullates 0stlimates.
a. S3, FSE, and combat trains CP provide current and accurate friendly status.
Initial status is provided within 15 minutes. Completed estimates arc available
before commander's war gaming.
b. S2 provides intelligence estimate, and situational and events templates
before commander begins war gaming.
•:. TV :ommrander or maht CP (flC gIve Initial guidan.e.. :
a. Restates mission, which includes brigade commanders intent for TF, and
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b. Disseminates instructions on information requirements and initially required
preparation actions (movement, resupply).
c. Presents initial guidance within 30 minutes of receipt of order.
m~M~n C oi . io fta~eienn~ mvemntrecnnaissance, an,
9 FRAGOs are issued to subordinates as soon as decisions are made to
make maximum use of time.
" !*760: Man 8ICcordnaescolletio oladlloa 0 norato
a. Staff collects all needed and available information from brigade, supporting
elements, adjacent elements, and subordinates to update estimates.
b. All information directed by the TF commander is collected.
c. Information is available when the commander returns from reconnaissance
and finishes war gaming.
* comaner ad. taffdevlop ndMar: game courses.of acto n
a. Tactically feasible and full courses of action (include CS as well as maneuver)
are made and war gamed with the available staff. (The command group
principles-commander, S3 and S2 representatives, and fire support
representative - are best for quick-planning sequences; while the TF main CP
principles-add the XO, engineer, ADA officer, S1, S4, FAC, and signal
officer-are included in more deliberate situations.)
b. Selected course of action accomplishes the mission and all directed tasks,
and complies with the brigade commander's intent.
c. Selected course of action is war gamed and refined by the commander and
staff so the staff understands the concept, produces a sound OPORD, and
rehearses the battle. The commander's concept and guidance for preparation
of the order includes:
"* An intent (overall purpose and end result).
"* Designation of main effort (for each phase if shifting is
envisioned).
"* A scheme of maneuver outlining missions, movement, and primary
tasks of all combat elements through completion of mission.
"* A plan of fires outlining scheme, tasks, and priorities for fire
support. Fire support execution matrix is used, when possible.
"* A plan for engineer support outlining missions, primary tasks,
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a. The OPORD complies with the commander's guidance.
b. The OPORD is completed at time directed.
e OPORD is concise and complete, and accomplishes the mission.
•X1i•. TVIsiues the.OPORD/FRAG~fring order•~• ,:: :.~
a. OPORD/FRAGO/warning order is issued IAW one-third, two-thirds rule
and makes full use of daylight time.
b. OPORDIFRAGO/warming order accomplishes all directed missions and
tasks, complies with the brigade commander's intent, and is doctrinally sound.
c. All subordinate and supporting elements receive the OPORD.
d. Brigade and adjacent units receive TF OPORD.
e. OPORD issued with an annotated overlay.
f. The OPORD has-
* Task organization.
"* Mission.
"" Concept and intent for maneuver, supporting fires, and
mobility, countermobility, and survivability.
"* Missions/tasks for each subordinate and fire support.
"* Coordinating instructions needed to synchronize the efforts of
maneuver forces and combat support.
"* Necessary CSS instructions.
g. If more time is available, a more developed OPORD is issued. (An initial
FRAGO may be issued to allow subordinates to begin preparation.)
h. Order is given at a location that reduces travel time, allows observation of
the zone/sector, and promotes OPSEC.
i. If time is available, the TF commander conducts brielbacks and war gaming
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j. Subordinate leaders and staff should conduct lateral coordination before
leaving the orders site.
a. Time is used to continue gathering information and to improve the plan
(develop contingency plans, refine fire plans).
b. Critical new information is disseminated to the commander, staff, and
subordinate/supporting headquarters.
c. Preparation and combat status are kept current and accurately maintained
(reconnaissance, construction of obstacles/survivability positions, resupply,
maintenance, locations and actions of subordinate/supporting elements,
movement).
d. Preparation problems are identified, corrected, or coordinated with the
appropriate element for correction.
~t.$na 4ffcer. mrana ~o mC tOn Vlan.'Tepa
a. Provides for antijamnuing (alternate frequencies, code words).
b. Coordinates issuance of SOIls.
c. Provides for use of relays to maintain communications with subordinates.
d. Recommends alternate means of communication for radios.
a. Issues FRAGOs for the commander.
b. Analyzes and collates information from other nets, and keeps the
commander updated by providing concise and consolidated updates.
c. Coordin ites with adjacent and supporting elements.
d. Provides critical CS and CSS information to the commander from the field
trains CP.
e. Communicates to subordinates who the commander cannot reach.
f. Coordinates additional support from brigade.
g. Performs any action needed to support the commander fighting the battle.
h. Coordinates the movement of the battalion mortars.




SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS: GO NO-GO
+ 1. M~nCP rprt.
a. Reports allow thc brigade to follow the battle.
b. Reports arc accurate, follow prescribed formals, and submitted NLT time
specified in OPORDs or SOPs.
. AS f .R0)MANCE.SUM R BLOCKý1
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